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INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that climate change is an urgent problem, re-
quiring urgent attention at all levels of government. Climate change
policies are likely to require pervasive technological, economic, and be-
havioral changes at every level of society, with potentially profound im-
plications. Policymakers will have to determine not only how much to
reduce, but how the reductions are to be achieved and with what conse-
quences for whom. Who will make these critical decisions?
Policymakers and scholars alike are struggling with the federalism
question: whether climate change regulation should flow from a global,
national, state, or local level. In this article, I provide theoretical and
practical justifications for a cooperative federalist approach that strives to
avoid the weaknesses and build on the strengths of each level of govern-
ment. I then provide specific proposals for federal legislation that are
designed to garner the advantages of federal regulation while respecting
the states' autonomy to set more stringent standards and tailor critical
implementation decisions to state-specific conditions.
Part I establishes the fundamental importance of federal legislation.
Collective action and leakage concerns will undoubtedly necessitate
overarching global and national approaches. Moreover, given mis-
matches in the costs and benefits of climate change regulation experi-
enced by individual states, under-regulation by the states is likely. Fed-
eral legislation would also offer greater economies of scale and consis-
tency than state-level approaches.
Notwithstanding the importance of federal legislation, Part II ad-
dresses the states' critical role within a federal structure in light of the
pervasive local impacts of climate change, the significant political, eco-
nomic, and environmental implications of alternative regulatory ap-
proaches, and the local nature of many potential climate change strate-
gies. Moreover, a federal monopoly on regulatory authority could create
institutional inertia and would fail to provide a check on interest group
capture.
After reviewing the theoretical justifications for allowing a state
role, Part II turns to a case study on the environmental justice provisions
in California's climate change legislation that illuminates several key
state interests. California's innovative climate legislation not only estab-
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lishes ambitious greenhouse gas reduction goals, it also requires that
those goals be achieved in ways that protect and enhance air quality in
polluted communities. If national legislation creates federal goals and
implementation structures that explicitly preempt such state initiatives, or
if the courts interpret future federal statutes to implicitly preempt state
laws, then the states will have lost the power to control the impacts of
climate change regulation. More broadly, the nation will have lost the
"laboratories" of innovation that the states could otherwise have pro-
vided.
Part III evaluates existing cooperative federalism models. It notes
that the most significant federal legislation proposed to date, the Warner-
Lieberman bill, provides only a limited role for the states. Other climate
change and domestic environmental law programs provide greater in-
sights on model cooperative federalist structures. In the climate change
context, I consider the relatively decentralized approaches taken by the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the European Union's Emissions
Trading System. On the domestic front, I consider the Clean Air Act,
which gives the federal government the authority to establish minimum
goals but gives states the discretion to adopt stricter environmental goals
and shape implementation to respond to state-specific political and eco-
nomic needs. While these models have not operated with full success,
they suggest options worthy of further consideration.
Part IV provides a preliminary sketch of a cooperative federalist
structure for federal climate change legislation and analyzes the specific
benefits of shared federal and state responsibilities. It argues that the
federal government should set minimum goals and standards, but that, in
most cases, it should not preempt state efforts to set more stringent goals
or standards. It then turns to program implementation, and argues that,
in light of the key environmental, political, and economic implications of
cap-and-trade programs, states should be allowed (but not required) to
administer such programs subject to minimum federal standards. State
autonomy over critical decisions is worth some potential loss in consis-
tency and efficiency.
In addition, I suggest that state implementation planning, similar to
that employed under the Clean Air Act, would facilitate the achievement
of both federal and state goals. Federal emission reductions goals could
be allocated to the states, and state implementation plans could then be
required to show how each state will integrate federal minimum require-
ments and adopt its own initiatives to achieve its required reductions.
Federal goals will not be achievable without state-directed actions, like
land use and transportation controls. Moreover, the states' unique cir-
cumstances and preferences are likely to prompt differing strategies for
reaching climate change goals. State implementation plans could pro-
vide a critical mechanism for demonstrating how federal and state meas-
ures will be combined to achieve the nation's overall objectives.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
In the absence of U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the
absence of a comprehensive federal regulatory approach,' the states have
taken the lead in adopting significant climate change initiatives.2 Cali-
fornia's Global Warming Solutions Ace and the northeastern states' Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,4 as well as several other less specific
or developed state and regional programs, have been critical.5 However,
initiatives to date are unlikely to reduce emissions sufficiently to address
the threat of climate change.6 Furthermore, given the global nature of
climate change, future state initiatives are unlikely to provide a sufficient
response.
In determining the appropriate jurisdictional level for regulation,
scholars frequently refer to the "matching principle": that the jurisdic-
tional level should match the scale of the environmental problem in ques-
tion.7 Local environmental problems should be resolved at a local level,
problems that cross state lines should be resolved nationally, and, pre-
sumably, problems that cross national boundaries, like climate change,
should be resolved internationally. Matching the jurisdiction to the
problem means that the jurisdiction can fully account for the net costs
and benefits of regulation. Otherwise, perverse results would ensue.
1. See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change. What Role for
Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F.L. REV. 39, 42-45 (2007) (describing weak
federal initiatives).
2. See Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not: Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the
Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 369, 372 (2006) (describing a wide range of state programs); JR. DeShazo & Jody Freeman,
Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499,
1521-30 (2007) (same); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Moti-
vating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1016-29 (2006) (same); Robert B.
McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism in Climate-
Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace when States Take the Lead, 20 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61, 76-84 (2007) (listing state programs).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 2007).
4. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (Dec.
20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou-final 12_20_05.pdf [hereinafter MEMORAN-
DUM].
5. See Abate, supra note 2, at 372; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1521-30; Engel
supra note 2, at 1016-29 (listing sources that describe state programs). The Pew Center for Global
Climate Change provides up-to-date information on state programs. See Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, What's Being Done . . . in the States, http://www.pewclimate.org/what s
beingdone/in the states/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
6. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons:
The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 220-23 (2005); Jonathon B. Wiener, Think
Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966-67
(2007).
7. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Case for Reallocating Federal Authority, 14 YALE. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1996); see, e.g.,
Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 191-92 (describing "matching principle").
8. See Wiener, supra note 6, at 1964.
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For example, in the context of global climate change, states may be
unwilling to regulate sufficiently because the costs of regulation-all
internal-could exceed the benefits-benefits necessarily shared with the
rest of the globe. 9 Leaving action solely to the states also creates the risk
of free riders, who hope to benefit from other states' regulation but are
unwilling to assume the costs themselves.' 0 States acting alone consis-
tently fear "leakage": that state regulation to control greenhouse gas
emissions will drive economic activity to unregulated states, merely relo-
cating rather than reducing emissions." If the emissions simply shift
location, then the regulating state would not have achieved its reduction
goal and could, in the meantime, have suffered adverse economic conse-
quences from its regulation. Leakage concerns are thus likely to chill
state action. A related concern is the race to the bottom, in which states
forego or weaken desired environmental regulation because they fear it
could drive away business.12
In addition, in the climate change context, different states perceive
different internal cost/benefit alignments. Some states might perceive
significant benefits from controlling greenhouse gases and not experi-
ence significant costs from its regulation.' 3  California, for example, is
9. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1518; Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman & Arthur
N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 7 (2005); Wiener, supra note 6, at 1965. Similarly, Professor Engel notes that, where pollu-
tion crosses state boundaries, states will pollute too much because they can externalize the environ-
mental costs while retaining economic benefits. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 164 (2006).
10. See Kaswan, supra note 1, at 72; Wiener, supra note 6, at 1965.
11. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1532 (describing leakage risk in the context of
state renewable energy requirements); Wiener, supra note 6, at 1967-73. Professor Wiener notes
that leakage could take several forms. Under the "price effect," regulation could lead to higher
prices, prices which would shift consumer demand to products made in states or countries lacking
controls. Id. at 1967-68. The "slack off' effect is a form of the free rider problem: If states see
other states taking aggressive measures, they might slack off their own efforts. Id. at 1968. The
"capital relocation" effect could occur if industries respond to regulation by relocating to unregu-
lated states or countries. Id. at 1968. Professor Wiener provides a thoughtful analysis of the factors
that could influence the potential net emissions consequences of these forms of leakage. Id. at
1969-73.
12. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1518-19; Wiener, supra note 6, at 1965. Aca-
demics have debated the validity of the race-to-the-bottom theory. See Kaswan, supra note 1, at 62
n.122. Professor Revesz has argued that states engage in competition for both businesses and citi-
zens that allows them to choose the balance of environmental and economic amenities that best suits
their preferences. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210,
1211 (1992). The dynamics of interstate competition in any given instance are complicated, but it is
conceivable that, at least in some instances, the fear of losing business would deter a state from
enacting desired environmental regulation. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-
Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 303-04 (1997)
(providing empirical data suggesting that states fear that their environmental regulations could deter
economic investment).
In California, regulators confront the risk of economic flight as they develop their climate
change regulations. Entities likely to be subject to the state's climate change regulation have stated
that they will move their operations outside the state if the state's regulations are too onerous. See
Matthew Yi, Dems, Governor Spar over Road to Clean Air, S.F. CHRON., July 17, 2007, at Al.
13. Kaswan, supra note 1, at 66-67.
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deeply concerned about the impact of climate change on its coastline, its
water supply system, and its air quality.14  In addition, given its strong
technology sector, California anticipates net economic benefits from
climate change regulation as the state develops the innovative technology
necessary to transition away from a carbon-intensive economy.' 5 More-
over, California's control costs could be less than those of other states
because it is not heavily dependent on coal, a significant source of
greenhouse gases.' 6 Other states might foresee fewer short-term benefits
from controlling greenhouse gas emissions, but expect significant costs.
1 7
For example, a state that relies heavily on coal mining or burning is re-
sponsible for significant emissions, but would experience high costs of
control and, at least in the short-term, might not find the benefits of regu-
lation worth the costs. 
18
These disconnects between the causes and consequences of enmis-
sions, and the disconnects between the distribution of the costs and bene-
fits of control, suggest that reliance on the states could lead to significant
under-regulation. 19 In light of the United States' unwillingness to take a
global approach by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, 20 the next-best ap-
proach, under the matching principle, would be federal regulation. A
federal approach would require all states to address the out-of-state con-
14. See CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE CENTER, OUR CHANGING CLIMATE: ASSESSING THE
RISKS TO CALIFORNIA (2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-500-2006-
077/CEC-500-2006-077.PDF.
15. See Kaswan, supra note 1, at 66 (describing California's expectation of economic benefits
arising from its climate change legislation); Rabe, Roman & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 37-41 (de-
scribing states' interest in economic development opportunities associated with climate change
regulation).
16. See CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 2007
(ExECUTIvE SUMMARY) 11 (2007) (indicating, in Figure 6, that only 8 percent of California's en-
ergy comes from coal), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-100-2007-
008/CEC- 100-2007-008-CMF-ES.PDF.
17. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 92 (observing that some states are likely to
experience greater costs from climate change regulation than others).
18. See Rabe, Roman, & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 11 (observing that states with significant
economic investments in carbon-producing industries are reluctant to address climate change); cf
Zachary Coile, Energy Bill Draft Splits House Dems: It's Pelosi's Greens Against Industry Protec-
tionists, S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2007, at A7 (noting, in the context of support for federal legislation,
that lawmakers from coastal states have favored deep emissions cuts while those "from states pro-
ducing automobiles, coal and oil favor a go-slow approach."). States may also fail to act due to
agency capture. Powerful interests within a state could influence state policy in a manner ultimately
deemed inconsistent with that state's best interests. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to
Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 734-35 (2006) (discussing potential for "capture" of state government).
19. This is not to say that the states do not have any motivation for taking action; the presence
of so many significant state initiatives demonstrates that states have found sufficient political, eco-
nomic, and environmental justifications for action. See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate
Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem
and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1016-21
(2006); Kaswan, supra note 1, at 65-68. That said, however, the states' collective efforts are
unlikely to be sufficient.
20. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 186.
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sequences of their emissions and would reduce leakage among' the
states.2
Other arguments, in addition to the matching principle, support fed-
eral regulation. Rather than having each state explore the greenhouse-
gas-reduction potential of each sector, it would be more efficient for the
federal government to research technological and operational opportuni-
ties.22 The federal government also has more resources at its disposal2 3
In addition, although I argue for allowing state flexibility, the existence
of a federal approach is likely to reduce the multiplicity of approaches to
greenhouse gas regulation around the country. To the extent that many
states simply follow the federal approach, without adding state-specific
implementation measures, the number of diverse approaches would be
reduced in comparison with a purely state-based approach.24  Finally, to
the extent the federal government adopts a cap-and-trade program, a lar-
ger market could lower costs25 and increase the fluidity of the market by
creating more trading opportunities and smoothing out the consequences
of local events.26 The nation thus needs a federal approach to climate
change.
II. THE STATE ROLE IN A FEDERAL PROGRAM
Notwithstanding the need for federal legislation, the states have a
vital interest in establishing their own climate change goals and in assert-
ing at least limited control over key implementation decisions. In this
Part, I justify a cooperative federalist approach 27 that sets significant fed-
eral minimum standards and then provides states with considerable
autonomy to exceed federal minimums and implement greenhouse gas
21. A federal approach would not, however, address the risk of international leakage: the risk
that federal domestic legislation could shift emissions to countries that are not regulating greenhouse
gas emissions. See Wiener, supra note 6, at 1967-68 (describing leakage caused by single-country
regulation in the absence of a global agreement).
22. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570, 614-15 (1996) (describing greater efficiency of federal regulation).
23. Id. at 585-86.
24. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 105 (suggesting that minimum federal stan-
dards would establish floors that would lead to more uniform standards than a purely state-based
approach).
25. Lower costs are beneficial if they allow regulatory authorities to set higher emissions caps
than they would if reductions were more expensive. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOOLS OF THE
TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION
CONTROL (2003), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/tools.pdf. Lower costs could also
alleviate the economic costs of addressing climate change. That said, however, lower costs are
beneficial only to a point. If costs are too low, then regulated entities and the technology sector will
not receive a sufficient price signal to invest in alternative emission-reducing technologies.
26. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 228.
27. Scholars have historically focused on dual federalism: the respective roles of the states
versus the federal government. See Engel, supra note 9, at 163-66, 175. Recent scholarly attention
has focused on the idea of cooperative federalism, which embodies shared powers and, at times,
overlapping federal and state roles. Id at 175-76 (noting scholarly literature on "dynamic federal-
ism," "empowerment federalism," "polyphonic federalism," "interactive federalism," and "vertical
regulatory competition").
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reduction strategies. The appropriate balance between federal and state
responsibility depends, of course, on the nature of the regulatory strat-
egy, a subject I address in the context of specific proposals in Part IV,
below.
After describing the theoretical justifications for creating a coopera-
tive federalism approach, I use the environmental justice provisions in
California's climate change legislation as a case study on the practical
importance of allowing state implementation autonomy.
A. Theoretical Justifications for a Strong State Role
1. Arguments in Favor of State Autonomy
The "matching principle" provides important insights into why a
regulatory jurisdiction should match the scale of the environmental prob-
lem, and why climate change requires a global and national solution.28
But that is not the end of the story. Additional "matches" suggest the
suitability of multiple levels of regulation.29
Environmental problems are not one-dimensional: Global problems
like climate change have local manifestations that could shape the nature
of a locality's desired response. Thus, as suggested above, a state like
California, that perceives significant risks from climate change, could be
willing to establish more stringent goals than the federal government.
Similarly, the consequences of climate change regulation are local.
Climate policies that require local industries to reduce greenhouse gases
will have local economic consequences, both positive and negative, that
will depend upon the nature of the industry, the ease of making reduc-
tions, and the chosen regulatory mechanism for requiring reductions.
30
Local reductions will also have local environmental consequences: Re-
ductions in greenhouse gases generally (although not necessarily) lead to
reductions in harmful co-pollutants. 31 The rate and distribution of green-
house gas reduction requirements could thus impact the local distribution
of harmful co-pollutants. Due to the economic and environmental impli-
cations of regulatory strategies, states thus have an interest in the strin-
gency of direct regulation as well as in the relative role of a cap-and-
28. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1604-06 (2007).
29. See id. at 1604-05, 1617 (critiquing the matching principle for its heavy focus on the
location of pollution, and arguing that other factors, including the benefits and harms of regulation,
should influence jurisdictional choice).
30. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 87-88 (observing that states can better devise
climate change programs to address their particular regional characteristics and industries).
31. See MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM FOR
CALIFORNIA 13 (2007) (observing that production changes that reduce greenhouse gases tend to
reduce co-pollutant emissions as well) [hereinafter MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES.
BD.].
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trade program and its operational features. While the global scale of
climate change requires an international and national response, the local
implications of climate change policies provide a justification for allow-
ing some state flexibility in determining how to implement national
goals.
A state role within a federal system is further justified by familiar
principles of democratic theory.3 2 As Professor Kirsten Engel has stated,
federal preemption "cuts short the lawmaking process and products of an
entire level of democratic government. 3 3 If states wish to achieve more
demanding goals, or to control the economic and environmental conse-
quences of climate change policies, then allowing states the latitude to do
so allows them to fulfill their citizens' preferences.34
Federal minimums which prevent states from setting lower goals or
standards may appear, at first blush, to prevent some states from realiz-
ing their preference for lower standards.35  But the federal minimum
would allow other states to meet their democratic preferences, since race
to the bottom and leakage concerns might have prevented some states
from adopting their ideal standards. 36 One state's democratic loss is an-
other's democratic gain. Moreover, the democratic argument has limits:
A state's choice not to control its emissions is less compelling where that
choice has adverse consequences for other states or, in this instance, for
the globe. 37 Democratic theory thus supports having federal minimums,
but allowing states to exceed them.
State initiatives may also be more amenable to "bottom-up" partici-
pation by affected constituencies.38 Including stakeholders in policy
development can provide policymakers with critical information that
could lead to more tailored and effective programs and could, potentially,
increase "stakeholder buy-in." 39 (However, since the states are as vul-
32. See Esty, supra note 22, at 609-10 (describing democratic theory in favor of decentralized
decision making).
33. Engel, supra note 9, at 184.
34. See Esty, supra note 22, at 610 (stating democratic justification for state-level jurisdic-
tion); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1976-77) (same); see also
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1519-20 (observing that state climate change initiatives have
been a response to their citizens' fears about climate change); Engel, supra note 2, at 1025; Glicks-
man, supra note 18, at 779 (noting that recent state environmental initiatives have been a response to
state citizen desires for environmental protection).
35. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1581, 1586.
36. Id. at 1580 (noting that federal minimums help states meet their preferences by dampening
the race to the bottom).
37. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 33 (observing that, in the case of interstate pollution
spillovers, pure state regulation would lead to political failure since the victim state would have no
capacity to control the polluting state's pollution); Stewart, supra note 35, at 1227 (stating that "a
state should not be entitled to invoke the principle of local self-determination against federal controls
where that state generates significant spillovers which impair the corresponding ability of sister
states to determine the environmental quality they shall enjoy.").
38. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 73, 87.
39. Id.
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nerable to political capture as the federal government, federal minimum
standards remain essential.4 0)
Another familiar argument in favor of retaining state flexibility is
that allowing the states to adopt alternative approaches fosters techno-
logical and regulatory innovation. 41 The states can act as "laboratories
for invention" by exceeding minimum federal product, production, or
renewable portfolio standards, thereby promoting technological innova-
tion that could provide models for other industries or jurisdictions.42
Differing regulatory approaches, like direct regulation, variants on cap-
and-trade programs, or new approaches to land use regulation, could
likewise test and provide models for other jurisdictions. Allowing state
experimentation is particularly appropriate where the problem to be ad-
dressed is new and where policymakers are uncertain about the best
mechanisms for addressing it.43 In the climate change context, Professor
William Buzbee has stated that "[i]n settings of volatility and diversity of
conditions, especially where knowledge is incomplete and evolving rap-
idly, room for pragmatic adjustment and experimentation is critical." 44 A
cooperative federalist approach that establishes basic federal parameters
but allows states to diverge could provide the best of all worlds; it takes
advantage of the economies of scale of a federal approach, while allow-
ing state experimentation.
Allowing a diversity of requirements and approaches also helps
counteract potential defects in legislative and regulatory processes.45
Federal preemption of divergent state approaches lodges complete power
in a single federal decision-maker. 46 Once federal decision-makers act,
they could fail to review and assess the standards or approaches they
have adopted.47  They could develop a significant institutional invest-
48ment in the status quo. Allowing states to develop more demanding or
divergent standards and approaches would create a diversity of players
simultaneously working to solve similar problems, stimulating continual
interaction, challenge, debate, reexamination, and inquiry.49 While that
40. See Glicksman, supra note 18, at 734-35 (discussing risk of agency capture at the state
level).
41. See Engel, supra note 9, at 182-83.
42. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, California is allowed to adopt vehicle emission
standards that differ from federal requirements, so long as EPA waives the normally-applicable
federal preemption provision. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b) (West 2008). The differing requirements
have prompted technological innovation. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Green-
house Gas Emissions, 37 DAVIS L. REV. 281, 313-18 (2003).
43. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1619; Engel, supra note 9, at 182.
44. Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1619.
45. See id. at 1597; Engel, supra note 9, at 178-81.
46. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1597.
47. Id. at 1594-95.
48. Id. at 1595, 1608-09.
49. id. at 1588-89, 1597; Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 53 (observing that centralized
decision making impedes the detection of policymaking errors); Engel, supra note 9, at 170-73
(describing the dynamic innovation encouraged by the interplay of state and federal standard-
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conflict may not always be comfortable, having a multiplicity of players
is more likely to lead to continuing assessment and improvement in tech-
nological requirements and regulatory programs than a preemptive fed-
eral approach.
Having a multiplicity of players could also ameliorate the risk of
agency capture, at both the federal and state levels.50 If Congress or im-
plementing agencies are heavily influenced by particular interest groups
to the detriment of the public interest, 51 and the federal law preempts
divergent state approaches, then there is no antidote for the political fail-
ure.52 Without attempting to resolve the fine line between "capture" and
the appropriate operation of the political process in balancing diverse
needs, one could imagine that interests heavily invested in the short-term
future of coal or the existing state of the automobile industry could influ-
ence legislative or regulatory processes in ways that (arguably) under-
regulate in light of the long-term risks posed by climate change and the
general public interest. Given the risk of federal agency capture, the
states could retain the authority to impose more demanding require-
ments.5 3
A state role may also be necessary to address issues that are better
suited to state and local resolution than federal resolution. Without es-
sentializing the nature of "federal" versus "state" activities, certain gov-
ernmental decisions, like land use and building codes, have traditionally
been under state control. This is not to say that the federal government
should be precluded from addressing these areas. Even so, the federal
government could be more successful at meeting national goals if it
enlisted the states' assistance and cooperation in areas traditionally
within their control.5 4
2. Concerns Raised by State Autonomy
In the context of regulatory standards and the operation of a cap-
and-trade program, inconsistency is a significant consequence of allow-
ing states to diverge from federal standards and giving them implementa-
setting); see also infra notes 239 to 248 and accompanying text (describing the dynamic tension
between state and federal appliance efficiency and vehicle emission standards).
50. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1594-95; Engel, supra note 9, at 161, 178-81.
51. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1590-91, 1609.
52. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 53; Engel, supra note 9, at 163.
53. In theory, there is also the risk of agency capture by environmentalists, leading to overly
restrictive regulation at the federal or state level. For example, if environmentalists captured the
federal legislative process, then arguably states should be allowed to set standards below the federal
level to provide an antidote to environmentalists' control at the federal level. In light of the relative
power of the interest groups, and the diffuse nature of the public's concern about climate change in
comparison to the intense interest of the regulated community, this risk appears less compelling than
the risk of industry capture.
54. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1218 (1995)
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tion discretion.55 Nationwide industries could encounter differing stan-
dards in different states, leading to inefficient production and manage-
ment.56 If states could impose their own requirements on a cap-and-trade
program, the program's transactions costs would increase. From a par-
ticipatory standpoint, industries and public interest groups would have to
monitor and participate in proceedings around the country, rather than
focusing their resources on federal legislative and regulatory process.57
Consistency is an important, but not necessarily determinative, fac-
tor. The virtues of consistency must be weighed against the benefits of a
diversity of approaches. The significance of consistency is also depend-
ent upon the type of regulation at issue.58 For example, inconsistent
product standards could adversely impact industrial efficiency.5 9 In con-
trast, overarching environmental goals have relatively little impact on
industrial efficiency, and do not present a compelling case for preemp-
tion.60 Process and performance standards, permitting structures, and
other regulatory options fall somewhere in between.61  I discuss these
issues in the climate change context more specifically below, in Part IV.
A cooperative federalist approach would also pose less risk of in-
consistency than a pure reliance on state initiatives. A federal approach
that gave states the option, but did not mandate, state divergence or im-
plementation would likely limit the degree of diversity. Under existing
cooperative federalist approaches, many states do not choose to deviate
from the federal minimums.62
In addition to inconsistency, another potential risk of state action is
that states could develop requirements that favor their own interests and
jeopardize out-of-state interests. Climate change policy could thus be-
come a protectionist vehicle.63 State product standards pose this risk if
55. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1600.
56. See Carlson, supra note 42, at 313-14; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1530-31.
57. See Engel, supra note 9, at 181 (noting that most interest groups would prefer federal
policies so that they could avoid having to lobby in all 50 states); cf Stewart, supra note 35, at 1213-
15 (noting that, relative to industry, environmental groups are likely to have more power at the
federal level, given their relative lack of resources).
58. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1603-04 (arguing that the nature of the regulatory target is a
key factor in determining whether preemption-and its accompanying consistency-is appropriate).
59. See id. at 1603; Kaswan, supra note 1, at 82-83. Federal statutes addressing product
standards are more likely to preempt state approaches than other federal regulatory statutes. See
Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1561-64; Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 224-26.
60. Kaswan, supra note 1, at 82.
61. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1603-04; Kaswan supra note 1, at 81-83 (discussing the
benefits and drawbacks to preemption for a number of types of regulatory efforts).
62. Some states have gone so far as to pass legislation preventing their states from exceeding
federal standards. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environ-
mental Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive
Problems, 54 MD. L. REv. 1373, 1375-95 (1995).
63. In other words, states could engage in a form of "cost externalization" by imposing con-
straints on out-of-state interests for the benefit of in-state interests. See Butler & Macey, supra note
7, at 45-47 (describing cost externalization risk of state-level regulatory action). More broadly, this
theory suggests that states imposing external costs might fail to comprehensively analyze the costs
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they are designed to favor in-state industries and are not otherwise envi-
ronmentally justified.64 On the other hand, states may be unable to pre-
vent leakage and meet their goals without establishing policies that have
some impact on out-of-state interests. For example, California has en-
acted an environmental performance standard for electricity that essen-
tially prevents the state from using electricity generated by traditional
coal-fired power plants, 65 a standard that will have little impact within
the state, due to its lack of coal-fired power, but that is likely to reduce
certain electricity imports.66 Without the ability to impose the standard
on electricity imports, California's greenhouse reduction goals could be
undermined by utilities' switching from California energy sources that
must meet the standard to out-of-state sources that are not subject to it.
So long as they are environmentally justified, states should be allowed to
develop product or production criteria to meet their objectives, even if
such measures have an incidental impact on out-of-state industries.
Moreover, such restrictions often impose higher costs on in-state resi-
dents, thus providing a check on the risk of protectionist and self-serving
legislation.67 In such interstate conflicts, there is no obvious reason why
the regulating state's interests should cede to the impacted state's inter-
ests.
Climate change is unquestionably a global problem, and strong fed-
eral minimums are necessary. But the states have a vital interest in the
consequences of climate change and a major stake in the economic and
environmental consequences of climate change regulation itself. The
states could foster innovation and avoid the risk of federal complacency
and inertia. Allowing states to exceed federal minimums could also pro-
vide a structural antidote to potential agency capture at the federal level.
As Professor Kirsten Engel has stated, "[p]reemption ... is the real boo-
geyman of public interest lawmaking because it prevents the political
process from policing itself.,
68
and benefits of regulation. Using the example of a non-coal state imposing restrictions on the use of
coal, the theory posits that states might impose restrictions that provide them with environmental
benefits but whose costs they do not have to endure. See id. at 45, n.45 (quoting E. Donald Elliott et
al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 313, 329 (1985)). As Butler and Macey go on to note, however, the restricting state's
consumers generally experience higher costs from the regulation, even if its industries are not di-
rectly affected. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 47. In many situations, costs are not, in fact,
"externalized" in a manner that would lead to political failure. Id.
64. Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 45-48.
65. See Patricia Weisselberg, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West: Can Califor-
nia Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating
the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 185 (2007).
66. See id. at 213 (describing utility argument that the burden of the California standard will
fall heavily on out-of-state coal-fired power plants).
67. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 47.
68. Engel, supra note 9, at 163.
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B. A Case Study on the Value of State Autonomy: California's
Environmental Justice Provisions
1. Introduction
The environmental justice provisions in California's climate change
legislation help illuminate the value of retaining state autonomy within a
federal system. While the case study does not raise all of the relevant
issues, it reveals: (1) the local political, environmental, and economic
implications of climate change regulation; (2) the expression of uniquely
state-level political preferences that are unlikely to be manifested in fed-
eral legislation; and (3) critical state interests that could arise in the op-
eration of a cap-and-trade program, the type of program that many as-
sume operates best at a national if not an international scale. The envi-
ronmental justice case study highlights the states' strong interest in shap-
ing regulatory processes to meet state-specific goals and needs.
In 2006, California enacted one of the nation's first comprehensive
climate change statutes, 69 the Global Warming Solutions Act, commonly
referred to as AB 32.70 The statute requires the state to reduce its green-
house gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.71 Although it provides rela-
tively little detail about how to achieve the required reductions, the law
explicitly includes parameters to achieve environmental justice, regard-
less of the specific regulatory programs the state chooses to adopt.72
The environmental justice implications of potential implementation
strategies were a key issue in legislative deliberations. The Governor
strongly supported a cap-and-trade program while many legislators, con-
cerned about the environmental justice implications of market-based
systems, were opposed.73 As a consequence, the law permits but does
not require the creation of a market mechanism. 74 In addition, the law
requires the state's regulations to serve environmental justice through
provisions designed to enhance participation in the development of im-
plementing regulations, substantive environmental protections for pol-
luted areas, and provisions designed to direct economic opportunities to
disadvantaged communities.
69. Several northeastern states preceded California. See Abate, supra note 2, at 377-81. But
California's size and influence gave California's legislation greater national and international sig-
nificance.
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 2007).
71. Id. § 38550.
72. See infra notes 75 to I I and accompanying text.
73. See Mark Martin, Nunez Slams Governor on Emission Law, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2006,
at BI (describing legislature's rejection of the Governor's proposal to mandate a cap-and-trade
program).
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(a).
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2. Participatory Environmental Justice Provisions
Citizens' participation in decisions affecting their communities is a
central value in the environmental justice movement.75  Participation is
necessary (though not sufficient) to empower disadvantaged communi-
ties in decision making processes that have historically failed to serve
their interests. Participation also helps government agencies obtain first-
hand information about conditions in the communities their decisions
will affect.76
AB 32 explicitly encourages broad participation in the development
of its implementing regulations and participation by disadvantaged
communities in particular. 77  The law requires the California Air Re-
sources Board (CARB), the agency with primary implementation author-
ity, to consult a wide range of stakeholders in developing its regulations,
including "the environmental justice community, industry sectors, busi-
ness groups, academic institutions, [and] environmental organizations. ' 8
It requires the creation of an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee
(EJAC) whose members are to be drawn from the state's most polluted
areas, "including, but not limited to, communities with minority popula-
tions or low-income populations., 79 In addition, as it develops its regula-
tory scoping plan, the law requires CARB to hold public workshops in
regions of the state suffering from poor air quality, once again including,
but not limited to, minority and low-income communities.8 °
3. Substantive Environmental Justice Provisions
Substantively, distributive justice is a key goal of the environmental
justice movement.8 1 The movement seeks to redress the current inequity
in the distribution of pollution and its effects.82 Numerous studies have
documented substantial disparities in the distribution of polluting facili-
ties, which are more likely to be concentrated in of-color and low-income
communities. 81 In California, many areas of the state have failed to at-
75. See Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1045-
47 (2003) (describing claims in terms of "political justice").
76. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 159 (1999).
77. By "disadvantaged," I am referring to disadvantages such as disproportionate exposure to
undesirable land uses, to poverty, and to a lack of political power, conditions that are often corre-
lated with race and income.
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(f) (West 2007).
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591(a) (West 2007). The Environmental Justice
Advisory Committee has been constituted and includes representatives from a range of environ-
mental justice organizations around the state. See Cal. Evtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Global
Warming Environmental Justice Committee, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/ejac.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2008) (committee website, listing members).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(g) (West 2007).
81. See Kaswan, supra note 75, at 1043-44.
82. Jd. at 1037-39 (summarizing theories of distributive justice).
83. Id. at 1069-77.
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tain the nation's ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) and attainment
remains a far-off goal.84
Although carbon dioxide does not cause local environmental conse-
quences,85 climate change regulation nonetheless implicates local pollu-
tion because the chief source of greenhouse gas emissions, combustion,
generates not only carbon dioxide, but a host of problematic co-
pollutants.86 These co-pollutants can include nitrogen oxides, sulphur
oxides, particulates, mercury, volatile organic compounds, and, in some
cases, an array of other hazardous air pollutants. While not directly cor-
related, policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are likely to have
the co-benefit of reducing co-pollutants.87 Similarly, policies that allow
greenhouse gas emissions to remain the same will not generate co-
pollutant reduction benefits, and policies that allow greenhouse gas emis-
sions to increase in local areas (presumably offset by decreases else-
where) could cause at least some degree of local increases in co-
pollutants.
In the ensuing subsections, I first consider provisions addressing co-
pollutant emissions, including provisions that are designed to prevent
increases in pollution and provisions that are designed to ensure that the
state reaps environmental and economic co-benefits from climate change
regulation. Next, I briefly consider how such provisions could affect the
development of climate change regulations. Finally, I consider the pro-
vision designed to channel potential economic opportunities arising from
climate change regulation to disadvantaged communities and its policy
implications.
(a) Provisions Implicating Co-Pollutant Emissions
i. Provisions that Prevent Increases in Co-Pollutants
AB 32 states generally that CARB must "[e]nsure that the activities
undertaken to comply with [its] regulations do not disproportionately
impact low-income communities." 88 The statement is broad, and could
include both economic and environmental impacts. From an environ-
mental standpoint, it suggests that measures that could create "hot spots"
by increasing air pollutants in already-burdened areas would violate this
provision. For example, if the state's emerging low-carbon fuel standard
84. Maps indicating the California regions that are in and out of attainment for particular
criteria pollutants are available on the following website: ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 9, AIR
QUALITY MAPS, (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.epa.gov/region09/air/maps/maps-top.htnl.
85. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE,
LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 40-41 (2003), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/allreports/emissionstrading/.
86. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10287, 10298 (forthcoming May 2008).
87. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (West 2007).
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led to a net increase in problematic co-pollutants from mobile sources
that would most impact residents in low-income areas, 89 the law could
require the state to impose additional vehicle emission controls. 90
The greatest controversy has concerned the potential adoption of a
cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions.91 A cap-and-trade
program could have significant distributional consequences, since some
facilities might reduce on behalf of others, who might not reduce at all or
could, subject to existing limits discussed below, increase their green-
house gas emissions through purchasing allowances. If allowances are
auctioned, some facilities would purchase less than existing emissions,
some would maintain emissions, and some could potentially purchase
enough allowances to increase emissions (subject to existing limits).
AB 32 addresses the risk of hot spots. The law specifically states
that CARB must consider potential "direct, indirect, and cumulative
emission impacts ... including localized impacts in communities that are
already adversely impacted by air pollution" before adopting a market
mechanism. 92  CARB must not only evaluate such impacts; it must de-
sign market mechanisms "to prevent any increase in the emissions of
toxic air contaminants or criteria pollutants."
93
That raises the key question: Would a greenhouse gas trading pro-
gram lead to localized increases in co-pollutant emissions, notwithstand-
ing aggregate reductions? The answer is complicated. For the most part,
a greenhouse gas trading program would not be the legal cause of co-
pollutant increases. Co-pollutants are subject to existing regulatory pro-
grams and a carbon trading program would not, presumably, displace
existing regulations. However, existing regulatory programs generally
allow emissions to increase up to a certain point.94 Most facilities are not
bound by absolute caps on their emissions; instead, they are subject to
89. The public health consequences of renewable fuels, and ethanol in particular, are con-
tested. A recent study suggests that, notwithstanding some environmental benefits, high ethanol use
could lead to a net increase in respiratory illnesses and deaths in certain regions due to synergistic
effects between ethanol-related emissions and existing pollutants. See Mark Z. Jacobson, Effects of
Ethanol (E85) Versus Gasoline Vehicles on Cancer and Mortality in the United States, 41 ENVIRON.
So. & TECH'Y 4150 (2007). Switching from gasoline to diesel, due to diesel's lower carbon content,
could also create environmental concerns due to the health risks associated with diesel's high par-
ticulate emissions. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., FACT SHEET: HEALTH EFFECTS OF DIESEL EXHAUST
PARTICULATE MATTER 4-5 (2006), http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/diesel/dpmdraft 3-01-06.pdf.
90. If additional vehicle emission controls are needed to address pollutants created by ethanol,
California would once again have to assert its unique authority under the Clean Air Act to adopt
mobile source standards that diverge from federal standards, and would once again have to request
an EPA waiver of the Clean Air Act's customary preemption provision. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b)
(West 2008).
91. Under a cap-and-trade program, a cap on total emissions for the regulated sector would be
set and pollution allowances would be distributed, for free or by auction, to regulated facilities. In a
traditional cap-and-trade program, facilities that reduced emissions could trade excess allowances to
facilities that did not receive enough allowances to cover their emissions.
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b)(1) (West 2007).
93. Id. § 38570(b)(2).
94. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10299-301.
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emission rate limitations.95 As long as the permissible rate of emissions
does not exceed their permit limits, they can increase the absolute quan-
tity of their co-pollutant emissions. 96  Actual amounts of co-pollutants
could increase up until the increase is deemed a "significant increase"
that triggers the Clean Air Act's rigorous pollution control requirements
for modified sources ("new source review" or NSR).97 Increases could
be locally problematic even if they did not trigger NSR.98 In addition, if
absolute increases in emissions are caused by an increase in hours of
operation or production, and not by a physical change to a facility, then
NSR would not be triggered notwithstanding a facility's significant in-
crease in emissions.99 Thus, a cap-and-trade program would not preclude
emissions increases that are already permissible under the existing regu-
latory system.
In a narrow set of circumstances, a cap-and-trade system could be a
more direct cause of emissions increases. 00 It is conceivable that a large
company with multiple facilities would make production decisions
based, in part, on the costs of greenhouse gas controls. It might choose
to lower production at facilities with lower costs of control. It might then
use the freed-up allowances to increase production, up to the constraints
imposed by existing co-pollutant permits, at facilities facing higher costs
of control. In this situation, the carbon trading system would have di-
rectly motivated, not simply facilitated, increased co-pollutant emis-
95. Under the Clean Air Act, the new source-related standards, like the New Source Perform-
ance Standards, Lowest Achievable Emission Rate standard for new sources in nonattainment areas,
and Best Available Control Technology Standards for new sources in attainment areas, are all pre-
sumptively emission rate standards. Id. at 10300 n. 131. Hazardous air pollutants standards are also
presumptively emission rate standards. Id. The standards are often framed in terms of emissions per
unit of production, pollutant concentrations per unit of emissions, or a rate of pollution over time.
Id. at 10300 n.132. Where smaller facilities seek to avoid being designated as "major" sources
subject to stringent pollution control regulation, however, they sometimes accept an absolute cap on
emissions so that their emissions will not exceed the "major" threshold. Id. at 10300 n. 129.
96. See id. at 10299-300.
97. See, e.g., DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK § 1:111 (2007)
(providing general description of NSR program for modified facilities).
98. The threshold for triggering NSR requirements differs by pollutant and by an air district's
degree of nonattainment. See id. § 1: 113 (indicating threshold for criteria pollutants). Thresholds
from 15 to 40 tons per year are common. See id. Increases of this magnitude could, depending upon
local circumstances and the number of facilities engaging in increases, create local concerns. More-
over, the increases can be more dramatic than the rule suggests. In determining the baseline from
which to measure an emissions increase, facilities can choose the average emissions during any two
year period within the preceding ten years, even if recent emissions were considerably lower. See 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(c) (2008). As a practical matter, facilities could therefore increase their
emissions considerably more than the threshold amount if their recent emissions have been lower
than they were during the preceding ten years.
99. NSR applies only to "modifications" to existing facilities that result in a significant in-
crease. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7501(4) (West 2008) (defining modification for facilities in nonat-
tainment areas by reference to the standard used for the New Source Performance Standards, which
defines modifications by reference to physical changes that significantly increase emissions). If the
emissions increase does not result from a physical change in the facility, it is not subject to NSR.
See 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(iii)(f) (2008) (stating that an increase in hours of operation or in the
production rate does not equal a physical change in operation).
100. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 13.
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sions. 1' 0 In addition, while greenhouse gas reduction measures are gen-
erally assumed to reduce co-pollutant emissions, some reduction meas-
ures could result in higher harmful emissions. For example, if a market
mechanism created an incentive to switch from gasoline to diesel due to
diesel's greater efficiency, the associated co-pollutants could increase,
subject only to the partial controls imposed by the existing regulatory
structure. 102
Thus, a cap-and-trade program would allow facilities to buy green-
house gas allowances that could incidentally lead to increases in existing
co-pollutant emissions up to the level allowed by existing co-pollutant
controls, and would therefore allow, and sometimes cause, increases in
criteria and toxic pollutants. A cap-and-trade program's flexibility
would allow co-pollutant emissions increases that a traditional approach
to greenhouse gas regulation would not. 10 3 Presumably, a more tradi-
tional approach would require all facilities to reduce greenhouse gases, a
reduction that would likely (although not certainly) reduce co-pollutant
emissions at all facilities and thereby avoid the potential increases that a
trading system could allow. These observations do not preclude the state
from adopting a cap-and-trade program, but they suggests that the state
must design the program to avoid co-pollutant emissions increases.
There is already some evidence that the law's environmental justice
provisions are shaping implementation principles. 14 To jumpstart a mar-
ket-based approach, Governor Schwarzenegger established a "Market
Advisory Committee" (the Committee) shortly after AB 32 was
passed.10 5 The first guiding design principle articulated by the Commit-
tee was that a California cap-and-trade program should "[a]void local-
ized and disproportionate impacts on low-income and disadvantaged
communities or communities already adversely impacted by air pollu-
tion."
10 6
101. See id. ("It is conceivable that.., the flexibility afforded by trading could cause a firm to
shift production from one facility to another in order to reduce GHG emissions at a lower overall
cost and that, because of differences in the industrial processes involved, this could lead to an in-
crease in emissions of a local pollutant at one facility.").
102. In addition, new power plant technologies are reportedly being developed that would
reduce greenhouse gas emissions but increase harmful particulate emissions.
103. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10301.
104. MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 10 (stating that the
Committee intended to recommend a system that was responsive to environmental justice concerns).
105. The Market Advisory Committee was created by Executive Order shortly after AB 32 was
adopted. See Exec. Order No. S-20-06 3 (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/
index.php?/executive-order/4484.
106. MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 11; see also id. at
16 (noting that, since some greenhouse gas mitigation strategies could implicate co-pollutant emis-
sions, CARB should "anticipate and address concerns about emissions hotspots.").
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ii. Provisions Requiring Environmental Co-Benefits
Preventing increases in co-pollutants is not the only environmental
justice issue presented by climate change regulation. Since climate
change regulation will produce a net decrease in greenhouse gas emis-
sions and, presumably, their associated co-pollutants, another key issue is
the distribution of the co-pollutant reduction benefits. 10 7 AB 32 contains
relevant provisions.
The above-noted requirement to consider impacts on low-income
areas 1 8 would include the requirement to consider whether greenhouse
gas regulations decreased co-pollutant emissions in such areas. More
specifically, AB 32 repeatedly requires the state to maximize the co-
benefits of climate change regulation, including its environmental co-
benefits. For example, the statute establishes the legislature's intent to
"maximize[] additional environmental... co-benefits for California, and
complement[] the state's efforts to improve air quality."' 0 9 The special
provisions guiding the design of a market-based system, if adopted, also
state that CARB should "[m]aximize additional environmental and eco-
nomic benefits for California, as appropriate."'"10 Arguably, decreasing
co-pollutant emissions is of greatest importance, and provides the great-
est benefit, in the state's most polluted areas. In addition, AB 32 states
that climate change regulations should complement "efforts to achieve
and maintain federal and state ambient air quality standards and to re-
duce toxic air contaminant emissions."'' AB 32 could thus require the
state to implement its climate change programs to maximize co-pollutant
reductions in the state's most polluted areas, where reductions would
help the state achieve its air quality goals and provide the greatest envi-
ronmental co-benefit.
AB 32's co-benefit requirements have influenced the principles ar-
ticulated by the Market Advisory Committee in its recommendations for
implementing a cap-and-trade program in California. The Committee's
second guiding design principle states that a cap-and-trade program
should "[a]void interference with the achievement of state and federal
ambient air quality standards,"'" 2 suggesting that it should lead to reduc-
tions, not increases, in co-pollutant emissions in nonattainment areas.
The Committee's third guiding design principle states, more generally,
that a cap-and-trade program should maximize co-benefits, "including
107. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10302.
108. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
109. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(h) (West 2007); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 38562(b)(6) (West 2007) (requiring CARB to consider the implementing regulations' "over-
all societal benefits, including reductions in other air pollutants... and other benefits to the econ-
omy, environment, and public health.").
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b)(3) (West 2007).
111. Id. § 38562(b)(4).
112. MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 11.
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reducing other air pollutant emissions .... 13 More specifically, the
report states that California should distribute pollution allowances "in a
manner that . . .advances the state's broader environmental goals by
ensuring that environmental benefits accrue to overburdened communi-
ties ....
iii. Mechanisms for Incorporating Environmental Justice
The most complex environmental justice issues are raised by cap-
and-trade programs, since they focus on aggregate pollution reductions
that could lead to an uneven distribution of co-pollutant emissions.1 5 In
this section, I briefly outline the ways in which the state's environmental
justice provisions could shape the ultimate implementation of a cap-and-
trade program. 16 While it is too soon to see how California will imple-
ment its program, this summary suggests the significance that state-
specific environmental justice policies could have on the implementation
of climate change mitigation strategies.
One option for dampening the risk of co-pollutant increases and en-
suring an equitable distribution of co-pollutant reduction co-benefits
would be to impose traditional control requirements in addition to adopt-
ing a market-based system. 17 The regulatory agency could assess feasi-
ble control strategies and simply require that they be undertaken. 1 8 That
approach could reduce greenhouse gas and associated co-pollutant emis-
sions at all facilities at the outset, thereby avoiding emissions increases
and widely distributing the co-pollutant reduction benefits of the regula-
tory system. 19  Thereafter, a cap-and-trade program could allow some
variation in emissions among facilities, but all of the facilities would be
starting from a lower baseline of co-pollutant emissions than would have
been the case if a market-based system were the exclusive control
mechanism. 120
113. Id.
114. Id. at 55.
115. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10294.
116. I have elaborated more fully on these potential mechanisms in other scholarship. See id.
at 10304-08.
117. See id. at 10304-05 (discussing approach). Others have addressed this combination of
trading and traditional approaches in the context of trading programs for non-greenhouse gas pollut-
ants. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 284-85
(1999); Johnson, supra note 76, at 162, 165; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 25, at 3-22, 3-25.
118. Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10304.
119. Id.
120. This approach could serve goals in addition to distributional justice. Trading programs to
date have experienced difficulty in generating emission reduction incentives, since they have fre-
quently set caps too high or distributed too many allowances. See id at 10295-96. A traditional
approach would ensure that all feasible reductions are undertaken, without waiting for the market to
incentivize such steps. A market-based system could, thereafter, be used to create incentives for
facilities to reduce emissions in new and innovative ways. Id. at 10304-05.
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In addition, California's environmental justice provisions could be
met by imposing conditions on trades to prevent increases and encourage
decreases in co-pollutant emissions in areas suffering from serious air
quality problems.121 In a cap-and-trade system, the state could identify
the areas suffering from adverse air quality and prohibit or limit trades of
allowances into those areas.' 22  Trades could be limited by increasing
allowance prices for emissions in polluted areas, or by requiring a greater
than one-to-one ratio of allowances to cover emissions, similar to the
offset program for nonattainment areas. 
123
An additional mechanism by which the state could address the im-
pact of a trading system on co-pollutant emissions would be to establish
a fund to finance co-pollutant reductions in communities where emis-
sions have remained the same or increased as a consequence of trading.
Such a mitigation fund could be financed by auction proceeds.124 The
fund could be used to finance facility reductions, finance less-polluting
public transit, or finance other mechanisms to reduce co-pollutants. 125
California's environmental justice provisions could also implicate
additional program parameters. Since allowances purchased from out-
side California do not result in in-state co-pollutant emission reductions,
the state could consider some limitations on out-of-state allowance pur-
chases. 126 (Such a restriction would be particularly controversial in the
context of a national trading program.) In addition, the state could con-
sider limiting the use of offsets from carbon sequestration activities, such
as tree planting, since biological carbon sequestration activities do not
lead to co-pollutant emission reductions. 2 7 Finally, the state could con-
sider limitations on emissions banking, since emissions banking could
121. See id. at 10305-06. In considering mechanisms for limiting the adverse distributional
impacts of a cap-and-trade program, others have noted the possibility of geographic limitations. See
Drury et al., supra note 117, at 284; Johnson, supra note 75, at 162; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 25, at 3-22.
122. Regulatory agencies could also address adverse distributional impacts by reviewing and
conditioning individual trades. See Kaswan, supra note 86 at 10305 (describing option). However,
the additional administrative resources required for that approach would likely cause a significant
interference with the market system's efficiency. Limiting trades based upon predetermined geo-
graphic boundaries would provide a more efficient mechanism for increasing distributional fairness.
Id.
123. Id. at 10306. The Clean Air Act requires new or modified sources in nonattainment areas
to obtain offsets for their emissions. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7503(c) (West 2008). The offsets generally
exceed the proposed emissions, and, for ozone nonattainment areas, the ratio depends upon the
severity of the nonattainment area. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(a)(4) (West 2008) (setting offset
ratio for a marginal ozone nonattainment area). In that way, new facilities lead to a net benefit in air
quality.
124. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10306; MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES.
BD., supra note 31, at 57.
125. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10306.
126. See id. at 10307.
127. See id.
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allow facilities to save allowances for later use, resulting in higher co-
pollutant emissions in the future.
128
It is too soon to determine whether California's environmental jus-
tice provisions will actually lead to the integration of any of these pro-
posals. 129 AB 32's environmental justice provisions may, however, have
influenced the state's decision to adopt multiple early action measures
that represent the state's commitment to a traditional regulatory ap-
proach.130 In addition, the state's Market Advisory Committee proposed
the mitigation fund option for reducing co-pollutants in its recommenda-
tions for a California cap-and-trade program.'
3'
(b) Achieving Economic Justice for Disadvantaged
Communities
AB 32 addresses not only the environmental implications of climate
change policy for disadvantaged communities, but its economic implica-
tions as well. Climate change policies are expected to generate a variety
of economic opportunities, including new technology development 32 and
new employment opportunities associated with increasing the energy
efficiency of our existing infrastructure. 33 To the extent possible, AB 32
requires the state to "direct public and private investment toward the
most disadvantaged communities in California.' ' 134  Achieving green-
house gas reductions could require labor-intensive efforts to increase the
energy efficiency of existing buildings, install solar or wind power, and
take any number of additional steps. 135  Currently, there is a shortage of
trained workers. 36 The state could "direct investment toward disadvan-
taged communities" by facilitating green-collar job training programs for
128. See id. at 10308.
129. The state is just beginning to develop its scoping plan for implementing AB 32, and held
its first public workshop on potential policy mechanisms, such as direct regulation and market
mechanisms, on January 16, 2008. The agency must adopt the scoping plan by January 1, 2009.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561 (a) (West 2007).
130. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE EARLY ACTION ITEMS,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccea/ccea.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (describing initial regulatory
measures to achieve AB 32's goals). In its workshops on developing a scoping plan for AB 32
implementation, agency officials have emphasized direct regulation as an important component of
the scenarios it is likely to consider. See Overview of Compliance Mechanisms for Emissions Re-
ductions, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/meetings/1 _16slides/session3mechanismsoverview.
pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (stating that "[d]irect regulations are a major part of AB 32 imple-
mentation.").
131. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 57.
132. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Legis-
lation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/print-
version/press-release/4111/.
133. See generally Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice
Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008)
(describing need for green jobs in disadvantaged communities).
134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38565 (West 2007).
135. See generally Burkett, supra note 133, at 33-39 (proposing mechanisms for creating green
jobs in disadvantaged communities).
136. David R. Baker, State Has Serious Green-Collar Labor Shortage, Summit Attendees Say,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2008, at Cl.
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unemployed workers in poor communities. In addition, meeting the
technological demands for a new green society will require new indus-
tries. Green enterprise zones could be established in poor communi-
ties. 37
4. Conclusion
This is not the place to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
proposed mechanisms for achieving environmental and economic justice.
Policymakers will have to consider multiple factors in meeting AB 32's
environmental justice provisions as part of an overarching efficient and
effective greenhouse gas reduction strategy. What the list of proposals
makes clear, however, is that a state's additional political and environ-
mental goals could have a significant impact on the implementation of a
cap-and-trade program specifically and greenhouse gas reduction poli-
cies more generally.
III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM MODELS
Having addressed the importance of federal legislation and the si-
multaneous importance of a vital state implementation role, the next is-
sue is how to design federal legislation to address federalism concerns.
Two key issues are presented by federal legislation: (1) who sets goals
and standards (and whether federal legislation preempts state efforts);
and (2) delegation of program authority.
Federal preemption of state goals, standards, or program parameters
is a significant issue in federal climate change policy debates.1 38 Facing
the prospect of diverse state approaches, some industries have supported
federal legislation as a mechanism for increasing consistency, and hence
support preemptive provisions.139 In contrast, states that have developed
their own approaches are generally wary of state preemption. 140 If Con-
gress decides not to explicitly preempt state efforts, the absence of an
explicit preemption provision may not be sufficient to eliminate the risk
of preemption. The courts have shown some tendency to find that Con-
gress has implicitly preempted state efforts.' 41 To avoid the risk of im-
plied preemption, federal legislation must therefore include explicit sav-
ings provisions that preserve the states' ability to adopt more stringent
standards.
137. See Burkett, supra note 133, at 37-38.
138. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1536 n.135 (discussing debate over preemption
clause in cap-and-trade bill).
139. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1569-70; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1533-36.
140. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1536 n. 135 (observing that a preemption provi-
sion in draft federal climate change legislation was dropped due to lobbying from California officials
trying to preserve their legislation).
141. See Glicksman, supra note 18, at 787-92 (describing courts' tendency to find implicit
preemption).
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A second critical federalism issue is the degree to which more gen-
eral implementation authority is devolved to the states. Federal legisla-
tion would need to clarify both the limits to and the breadth of the state's
implementation flexibility. Otherwise, questions could arise regarding
the extent to which state-level initiatives conflict with the overarching
federal program.
This Part analyzes the cooperative federalist features of proposed
federal legislation, two existing climate change programs, and the federal
Clean Air Act.
A. Proposed Federal Legislation
Of the many climate change bills introduced in the 110th Con-
gress, 42 Senators Warner and Lieberman introduced the bipartisan bill
receiving the most attention: America's Climate Security Act of 2007.1
41
The bill establishes a federal emissions reduction goal for the covered
sectors, 44 but explicitly preserves the rights of states to adopt and en-
force their own greenhouse gas standards and requirements, so long as
they are no less stringent than the bill's provisions. 45 By allowing states
to set more demanding goals and standards, the bill gives the states the
autonomy to realize state citizen preferences and fosters innovation, al-
beit at the cost of national consistency.
In terms of implementation, however, the bill is highly centralized.
The heart of the bill is a national cap-and-trade program. 46 Under the
bill, the federal government controls allowance allocation and is respon-
sible for ensuring that facilities have sufficient allowances to cover their
emissions. 47 The bill also establishes detailed parameters for the use of
142. At least six significant bills have been introduced in the Senate, and two in the House of
Representatives. See LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION:
CAP-AND-TRADE BILLS IN THE IlOTH CONGRESS 2 (Cong. Research Serv. 2007), available at
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Nov/RL33846.pdf. The Pew Center for Global Climate
Change's website provides up-to-date information on proposed federal legislation. See Pew Center
on Global Climate Change, Climate Action in Congress, http://www.pewclimate.org/what s_
beingdone/in the congress/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
143. S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
144. Id. § 1201(d).
145. Id. § 9004(a) (any state can "adopt or enforce--(1) any standard, cap, limitation, or prohi-
bition relating to emissions of greenhouse gas; or (2) any requirement relating to control, abatement,
or avoidance of emissions of greenhouse gas") and § 9004(b) (stating, as an exception, that the states
cannot adopt any such standards or requirements if they are less stringent than those imposed by the
bill). The law also encourages states to adopt more demanding emissions limitations by allocating
extra allowances to such states and permitting them to use the auction revenue for certain designated
purposes. Two percent of the total allowances are to be distributed among states whose reduction
targets exceed the federal targets and that have imposed more stringent limitations on their facilities.
Id. § 3402. The states are entitled to use the proceeds from the sale of these allowances for a variety
of designated purposes. Id. § 3403(c)(1).
146. See id §§ 1101-3504 (outlining the federal cap-and-trade program).
147. Id. § 1201 (establishing allowances to be allocated each year, effectively establishing each
year's cap); id § 1202 (requiring facilities to demonstrate compliance to EPA).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
offsets, 148 international trading, 149 emissions banking, 5 ° and emissions
borrowing.
151
While the bill's savings clause allows states to impose more de-
manding regulatory standards,' 52 it does not appear to provide states with
the authority to establish conditions on trades to control their potentially
adverse distributional impacts and could prevent states from controlling
other key political and economic variables. For example, the bill deter-
mines the ratio of free versus auctioned allowances, 153 a highly contested
issue with significant ramifications. The federal government also con-
trols most of the auction revenue.1
54
By including an explicit savings clause for state goals, the Warner-
Lieberman bill takes a step toward cooperative federalism. The bill does
not, however, provide a significant role for state implementation, or pro-
vide much guidance on how the federal government and the states can
together achieve climate change goals. 155 Federal climate change legisla-
tion would benefit from more sustained consideration of how to enlist the
strengths of each jurisdictional level.
B. Selected Cooperative Federalism Models
1. Climate Change Programs
The northeastern states' Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) and the European Union's Emissions Trading System offer ex-
amples of climate change programs that are more decentralized than pro-
posed federal legislation. 156 While a full examination of the role of fed-
eralism in the success or failure of these programs is beyond the scope of
this article, the programs provide models worthy of further consideration.
(a) The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Under the RGGI program, a number of northeastern states have
agreed to develop a regional cap-and-trade program for electric utili-
148. Id. §§ 2401-11 (Title II, Subtitle D, on offsets).
149. Id. §§ 2501-02 (Title 11, Subtitle E, on international credits).
150. Id. §§ 2201-02 (Title 1I, Subtitle B, on banking).
151. Id. §§ 2301-03 (Title II, Subtitle C, on borrowing).
152. See id. § 9004 (outlining states' authority to set more stringent standards).
153. Id. § 3201 (listing the percentage of allowances to be auctioned each year from 2012
through 2050, referred to as "Allocation for Annual Auctions").
154. See, e.g., id. § 4302 (specifying the distribution of proceeds from the federal government's
annual auction). Although the bill does allocate some allowances to states and provide them with a
wide range of choices over how to spend the revenue from the sale of those allowances, id. §§ 3401-
03, the vast majority of the allowances are controlled by the federal government.
155. Nor have any of the other bills proposed in the 110th Congress addressed the state role.
See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., John C. Dembach & Thomas D. Peterson, Federal Climate Change
Legislation as if the States Matter, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 3-4 (2008).
156. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 4; see also EUROPA, EMISSION TRADING SCHEME (EU
ETS), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/clinat/emission.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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ties, 1 57 slated to begin operation in 2009. 158 The Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) embodying the agreement includes a mix of centralized
and decentralized features. It establishes a regional emissions cap 59 and
then translates the regional goal into state-specific caps. 60  The MOU
does not explicitly preempt the states from setting more rigorous state-
specific reduction goals if they so choose, but the states are unlikely to
set more stringent goals since their interests were presumably already
embodied in the state caps they negotiated under the MOU.1
6'
The MOU, as well as the Model Rule the states negotiated to pro-
vide a template for each states' implementing regulations, 62 allows the
states some implementation discretion. The MOU gives the states con-
siderable discretion in the politically sensitive determination of how to
allocate allowances. While it requires the states to auction a minimum of
25 percent of the allowances and to allocate the proceeds to a "consumer
benefit or strategic energy purpose,"'' 63 the MOU does not otherwise ap-
pear to place constraints on the states' allocation rules and implicitly
gives them the discretion to determine whether to auction or distribute
the remaining 75 percent of their allowances. The states also retain per-
mitting authority.164
In contrast, the MOU takes a highly centralized approach on other
design features. For example, it requires all states to allow emissions
banking "without limitation,"' 65 and also requires the states to set a three-
year compliance period.
166
Other operational parameters appear to establish minimum require-
ments, without explicitly precluding states from taking a more stringent
approach. For example, the RGGI program imposes limitations on the
use of offsets, but does not explicitly prevent the states from imposing
additional limitations. 167  Nor does the MOU or Model Rule address
157. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 4.
158. Id. § 3(C).
159. See id. § 2(B).
160. Id. § 2(C).
161. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Overview of RGGJ C0 2 Budget Trading Pro-
gram 3 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/programsummary 10_07.pdf (observing
that the state caps embodied in the MOU were negotiated among the states).
162. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule (Jan. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model-rule corrected 1 5 07.pdf
163. MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 2(G)(I).
164. Overview of RGGI C0 2 Budget Program, supra note 161, at 3.
165. MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 2(I).
166. Id. § 2(E)(1). In other words, every three years, sources must prove that they had enough
allowances during the preceding three-year period to cover their emissions.
167. The MOU establishes "minimum," not final, offset eligibility requirements. Id. §
2(F)(l)(a). It indicates the type of offset projects that "may," not "must" be approved by a state, and
indicates the terms under which offset allowances "may" be obtained from elsewhere within the
United States, not that they "must" be accepted. Id. §§ 2(F)(1)(b), (2). The MOU also appears to
give the states the authority to allow greater use of offsets as a "safety valve"-that is, to allow states
to use more offsets if allowance prices increase past a certain point, rather than requiring them to
allow the greater use of offsets. Id. § 2(F)(3)-(4).
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whether states could impose limits on trading to help achieve co-
pollutant reductions in heavily polluted areas.
Although the MOU and Model Rule do not explicitly preempt most
state implementation variations, the states are nonetheless seeking con-
sistency. One of the program's "guiding principles for program design"
states that "[t]he program will emphasize uniformity to facilitate inter-
state trading in GHG allowances .... ,,168 According to a New York
State official, notwithstanding the MOU's potential flexibility, the states'
are currently striving for as much uniformity as possible.
169
The MOU indicates that if a comparable federal program is adopted,
"the Signatory States will transition into the federal program."'170 How-
ever, one participating official indicated that the RGGI states do not want
federal legislation to prevent them from meeting their unique goals or to
undercut their implementation decisions. 171
The RGGI program could provide important insights for future fed-
eral legislation. While the participating states have perceived the desir-
ability of uniformity in a cap-and-trade program, the program nonethe-
less suggests that state-specific caps and allowing states to control allow-
ance allocation are potential design options.
(b) The European Union's Climate Change Program
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European nations agreed to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to eight percent below 1990 levels by 2012.172
To meet their collective Kyoto Protocol goal, the European Union ini-
tially developed a "burden-sharing agreement" that establishes emissions
goals for each state.1 73 To address carbon dioxide emissions from certain
energy-intensive sectors comprising about 45 percent of European emis-
sions, the European Union established an Emissions Trading System
(ETS). 174 The program commenced trading in 2005.17
168. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Goals and Guiding Principles, available at
http://www.rggi.org/goals.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
169. Personal communication with Peter lwanowicz, Director, Climate Change Office, New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (March 28, 2008).
170. MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 6(C).
171. Personal communication, Peter lwanowicz, supra note 169.
172. LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY FOR KYOTO 2 (2007).
173. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME (EU-ETS) INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-5 (2005),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS%20White%20Paper.pdf. The percentage reduc-
tions for each country differ considerably, reflecting underlying economic and political circum-
stances in each state.
174. PARKER, supra note 172, at 1.
175. Id.
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The current ETS approach embodies a relatively decentralized co-
operative federalist approach.176  The European Commission provides
centralized principles and oversight but leaves key decisions to the mem-
ber states. 177 Under the first two phases of the ETS, each state had the
authority to establish its own emissions cap and to distribute allowances
to covered sources,1 78 subject to certain criteria established by the Euro-
pean Commission (EC). 179 In addition, the states can develop various
conditions determining sources' eligibility for allowances, like requiring
them to adopt existing greenhouse gas reduction technologies as a pre-
requisite to receiving allowances,' 80 as well as other policies. 81  The
states emissions goals, allocation decisions, and trading policies must be
embodied in a National Allocation Plan, which must comply with a
number of EC criteria and be approved by the EC.
18 2
In addition to establishing certain general criteria and oversight over
National Allocation Plans, the European Commission has largely dic-
tated the choice between auctions and the free distribution of allowances,
allowing states to auction only five percent in Phase 1 of the program
(2005-08), increasing to ten percent in Phase 2.183 Otherwise, however,
the programs are generally quite decentralized in their central attributes.
As one commentator has noted, giving countries the authority to de-
velop their own allocation plans has allowed them "to maintain substan-
tial control over energy policy and related economic investment .... ,,84
Decentralized state control has been controversial. 85 While it has al-
lowed states to control decisions of critical political and economic impor-
tance, the member states have not been successful at reducing actual
emissions. 86 Some states had inaccurate data on actual emissions and
included overly optimistic growth projections, resulting in caps that were
too high, flooding the market with allowances and failing to drive real
176. See JOSEPH KRUGER, WALLACE E. OATES, AND WILLIAM A. PIZER, DECENTRALIZATION
IN THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POLICY 5 (Feb. 2007) (Re-
sources for the Future Discussion Paper, RFF DP 07-02).
177. See id.
178. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 3.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 18. The practice of imposing threshold technology-based requirements has been
termed "benchmarking." Given the difficulties of determining appropriate technologies, however,
states have not generally pursued this option. Id. at 18. There is also some evidence that states have
manipulated the technology requirements to favor in-state resources. For example, Germany im-
posed technology requirements that favor domestic coal and provide no incentive to switch to less-
polluting fuels. Id. at 18-19.
181. The states can also set their own policies regarding how to allocate allowances to new
sources, id at 15, and on the marketability of emissions from facilities that have shut down. Id. at
17-18.
182. Id. at 3.
183. See id at 13-14. States have varied in their use of auctions, with only a few choosing to
auction any allowances in Phase 1 or Phase 2. Id.
184. Id. at 19.
185. See id. at 19-20; KRUGER, OATES, & PIZER, supra note 176.
186. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 6.
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reductions.1 87 In addition, states distributed allowances in a manner that
favored in-state businesses and created competitive distortions.
88
In designing Phase 3 of the European Union's program, slated to
begin in 2013, the European Commission has recently proposed substan-
tially revising the cooperative federalist approach to its trading pro-
gram, 89 although it has retained a strong state role for other aspects of its
climate change program. 90 According to a proposed plan issued in
January 2008, the program will become more centralized. Rather than
relying on the states to set their own caps, the European Commission will
set a European Union-wide cap and eliminate the NAP process. 19' The
states would remain responsible for distributing and auctioning allow-
ances, but would do so under EU-wide rules and based upon EU-wide
equity considerations.' 
92
While the European Commission proposal for Phase 3 centralizes a
formerly decentralized trading system, other aspects of the proposal con-
tinue to rely on member state actions. Since the trading program covers
only about one-half of the European Union's emissions, with the remain-
der coming from sectors like buildings, agriculture, waste, and small
facilities, the EC has set a European Union-wide emissions goal for the
non-trading sector, but then intends to set more specific non-ETS reduc-
tion targets for each state.' 93 The states would, however, be responsible
for determining how to meet the target. 194 The European Union has also
set a national renewable energy goal, but has then used numerous equita-
ble and practical factors to determine state-specific goals. 95 The states
themselves are to develop national action plans for meeting the EU's
state-specific renewable energy goals.
196
The EU's recent renunciation of a decentralized trading system sug-
gests that determining the appropriate mix of federal requirements and
state flexibility in a trading program requires care to ensure that state
187. Id. at 5-6. Thus, the cause of the ETS' initial failure could be partially attributable to
inaccurate data, not the system's decentralized nature.
188. See Press Release, Europa, Questions and Answers on the Commission's Proposal to
Revise the EU Emissions Trading System 2 (noting competitive distortions from state allocations)




190. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COMMITTEE, AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 7 (Jan. 23, 2008), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-COM:2008:0030:F1N:EN:PDF.
191. See Europa, supra note 188, at 3.
192. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 190, at 6.
193. See id. at 7.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The European Council has articulated the importance of letting member states decide
their own energy policy.
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flexibility does not undermine federal objectives. Rather than eliminat-
ing the state role entirely, the ETS's difficulties could perhaps have been
avoided by having the federal government, not the states, set each state's
trading sector cap, 197 and by having stronger federal minimum require-
ments. The EU's proposed approach to the non-trading sector, in which
it will establish state-specific goals but rely on the states to determine
how to achieve them, could provide a useful model for the United States'
domestic climate change policy.
2. The Clean Air Act
Cooperative federalism is nothing new in U.S. pollution policy:
The nation's primary pollution control statutes, the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the Clean Water Act (CWA), rely on a cooperative federalist ap-
proach.' 98 In this section, I focus primarily on the Clean Air Act because
it provides a highly relevant model for future climate change legisla-
tion.' 99
The CAA establishes minimum federal air quality goals, 200 criteria
pollutant controls for new sources everywhere and for existing sources in
nonattainment areas,2° 1 and hazardous pollutant controls for both new
and existing sources.20 2 On the preemption front, it preserves state
autonomy by explicitly allowing states to adopt more rigorous air quality
goals and source controls.20 3
More broadly, the CAA devolves significant implementation au-
thority to the states, giving the states the ultimate responsibility for
achieving national air quality goals. The states must develop state im-
plementation plans (SIPs) that demonstrate how the states will achieve
federal goals through applying federal minimum requirements, applying
197. Cf KRUGER, ET AL., supra note 176, at 7 (indicating the complexity of determining the
relative economic efficiency of having the Member States or the European Union establish each
state's trading-sector cap).
198. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1174 (1995).
199. The Clean Air Act is, of course, not just a model for future climate change legislation, but
a potential vehicle for current greenhouse gas controls. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 3
(arguing that, with a few modifications, the existing Clean Air Act could be used to address climate
change); McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 98-104 (same). Since it is an imperfect vehicle for
a global, as compared with a local, pollutant, Congress is likely to choose a new approach to address
climate change. I therefore treat the Clean Air Act as a model for future legislation.
200. The CAA requires EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards to protect
the public health and the environment from the most pervasive and ubiquitous pollutants. 42
U.S.C.A. § 7409(b)(1) (West 2008).
201. EPA establishes New Source Performance Standards, minimum technology-based stan-
dards for certain categories of new sources. 42 U.S.C.A. § 741 l(b)(l)(B) (West 2008). The Clean
Air Act establishes additional criteria for permits for new sources, including requiring the Lowest
Achievable Emissions Rate in nonattainment areas, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7503(a)(2) (West 2008), and
installation of the Best Available Control Technology in attainment areas. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a)(4)
(West 2008).
202. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(3) (West 2008).
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West 2008) (savings clause).
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more stringent source controls as necessary, and taking other measures
that may not be directly required under federal law.204  This structure
gives states the autonomy to respond to state-specific environmental
conditions and preferences.2 °5 To provide a "check" on the state's im-
plementation process, the federal government must approve the SIPs.
20 6
The Clean Air Act experience also offers two models for cap-and-
trade programs. The Acid Rain Program to address the long-distance
transport of sulphur and nitrogen oxides is a highly centralized national
program in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) controls
the nature and distribution of allowances.20 7 In contrast, aspects of the
cap-and-trade program under the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), a
rule EPA developed to address the interstate transport of nitrogen oxides,
sulfur oxides, and particulates, 2 8 are more decentralized. EPA estab-
lishes state-specific caps for each of the three trading programs created
by CAIR and then gives states the option of achieving the reductions
internally or participating in a regional cap-and-trade program.20 9 States
that choose to meet the nitrogen oxide cap by participating in a regional
trading program must comply with model cap-and-trade rules, but retain
considerable flexibility under those rules.2 10 States can choose how to
allocate allowances (by free distribution or by auction), how often to
distribute allowances, the basis for allocating allowances, and can set
aside allowances if they choose. 21 1 The CAIR program's decentralized
structure suggests the potential viability of a more decentralized cap-and-
trade program model than that currently contemplated by federal climate
change legislation.
The Clean Air Act's cooperative federalism experience has not been
an unqualified success: Despite general improvements in air quality, the
states have often been resistant to federal mandates 212 and have often
failed to develop state implementation plans that achieve federal air qual-
ity goals.213 Conceivably, stronger federal minimums could have set the
bar higher: The Clean Air Act has not been as rigorous for existing
sources as it is for new or modified sources. In addition, notwithstanding
204. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West 2008).
205. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198.
206. § 7410(k)(1)(C).
207. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (West 2008).
208. See Mack McGuffey & Gary R. Sheehan, Jr., Taking Care of CAIR, 20 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 67 (2005).
209. Id.
210. Id. The trading program for sulfur oxides is integrated with the nationally run Acid Rain
Program. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1199-1216 (describing state resistance to EPA's requiring
states to address land use, transportation, and automobile inspection and maintenance programs in
their SIPs); Percival, supra note 198, at 1161.
213. The extent to which many areas of the country continue to fail to attain air quality goals
testifies to the states' failure to meet air quality goals. See supra note 84 (providing website showing
the nation's nonattainment areas).
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the importance of state flexibility in developing SIPs and the history of
state resistance to federally-imposed SIP requirements,2 14 the federal
government may need to be even more detailed in its requirements and
more aggressive in its enforcement. A full analysis of the role of federal-
ism in contributing to the success or failure of the Clean Air Act is be-
yond the scope of this article, but would be a fruitful area for further in-
quiry.
Policymakers therefore have numerous cooperative federalist mod-
els to consider in designing future federal climate change legislation.
The experience to date suggests that strong federal minimums are essen-
tial to effective policies. At the same time, it also suggests that it is pos-
sible, if not necessary, to provide states with some autonomy to address
their state-specific goals and develop strategies for sectors that have his-
torically been within their control.
IV. A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF A COOPERATIVE FEDERALIST
STRUCTURE
In this Part, I indicate how a national policy could establish a strong
minimum federal response while retaining state autonomy. I first con-
sider the goals and standards question, and argue that the federal gov-
ernment should set strong minimum goals, such as emission reduction
goals and renewable portfolio standards (RPS), 2 15 but allow the states to
exceed those goals. In addition, I argue that the federal government
should set strong emission control standards but, again, generally allow
states to exceed them (with some qualifications where consistency is a
particular concern).
Setting goals and emissions standards alone are not likely to solve
the problem of climate change, however. A cap-and-trade program could
operate instead of or in addition to direct source controls. In this section,
I analyze the particular federalism issues raised by a cap-and-trade pro-
gram. But, since standards and/or a cap-and-trade program will only go
so far in meeting the nation's emissions reduction goals, I consider the
other mechanisms necessary to reduce emissions. The states could be
key players in addressing the mix of state-specific strategies, including
but not limited to standards and emissions trading. I thus discuss the
potential role of state implementation planning as a key attribute of a
cooperative federalist model.2 16 These preliminary ideas are intended to
generate an ongoing discussion about how to design a cooperative feder-
alist structure that maximizes the benefits of our federal structure.
214. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1199-1216.
215. A renewable portfolio standard is a legislative mandate which requires utilities to provide
a minimum percentage of electricity from renewable energy sources. See DeShazo & Freeman,
supra note 2, at 1523.
216. Many other implementation issues must, of course, be resolved, including permitting
enforcement, and the like. I have focused on two of the most controversial issues in this article.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 85:4
A. Climate Change Goals and Standards
1. Climate Change Goals
National action to set federal reduction goals is essential. Ideally,
the national goal should reflect the level necessary to reduce net emis-
sions to a sustainable level. However, federal legislation might focus
only on reduction goals in particular sectors, not on setting an overall
national goal.21 7 Moreover, even if a bill were to set a national goal,
opinions differ as to the necessary level. 218 Therefore, federal legislation
should allow states to set their own reduction goals, as long as they are at
least as stringent as the federal goal. As noted above, the Warner-
Lieberman bill not only allows, but encourages, such an approach.
21 9
Other goal-oriented federal programs, like renewable portfolio stan-
dards, could be designed similarly. The federal government could estab-
lish minimum national goals, but individual states could choose higher
goals in light of their citizen preferences and state-specific renewable
energy opportunities. Many states have already developed RPSs, and
federal law could capitalize on that momentum.22°
Federalism principles support strong federal minimum goals. As
discussed above, states could fail to take sufficient action based on state-
specific cost-benefit analysis, an analysis that could fail to take their im-
pact on other states into consideration. 22' A strong national minimum
would also overcome the other impediments to state action: the free
217. For example, the Warner-Lieberman bill, discussed above, establishes the goal of reduc-
ing emissions sufficiently to "avert the catastrophic impact of global climate change," S. 2191, 110th
Cong. § 3(1) (2007), but it does not set a national reduction goal; it simply sets a cap on allowances
for the following facilities covered under the cap-and-trade program: large facilities in the electric
power sector, industrial sector, transportation fuel sector, and nonfuel chemical sector. See id. §§
4(7) (defining "covered facility"), 1201(d) (establishing progressively declining cap for the covered
facilities). A bill proposed by Senator Feinstein is even more limited, focusing solely on a cap-and-
trade program for the electricity sector. The Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317,
110th Cong. (2007).
218. For example, the bills introduced by Senators Kerry and Snowe, on the one hand, and by
Senators Boxer and Sanders, on the other, both seek to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide at 450 parts per million. See Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th
Cong. § 702(a)(1)(A) (2007) (Kerry-Snowe bill); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007,
S. 309, 11 0th Cong. § 702(l)(B) (2007) (Sanders-Boxer bill). However, the Sanders-Boxer bill
assumes that emissions must be reduced to eighty percent below 1990 levels to achieve that goal, S.
309, § 704(c)(3), while the Kerry-Snowe bill assumes that goal can be achieved by reducing emis-
sions only sixty-two percent below 1990 levels. S. 485, § 702(a)(1)(B) (establishing a goal of reduc-
ing to sixty-five percent below 2000 levels). The Pew Center on Global Climate Change has con-
cluded that a sixty-five percent reduction below 2000 levels in equivalent to a sixty-five percent
reduction below 1990 levels. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, ECONOMY-WIDE CAP-
AND-TRADE PROPOSAL IN THE 110TH CONGRESS, http://www.pewclimate.org/doc
Uploads/1 10th%20Congress%20Economy-wide%2OCap&Trade%20Proposals%2001-30-2008%20-
%20Chart.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
219. S. 2191, § 3402 (providing that states that set more stringent reduction goals could receive
additional allowances).
220. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1523.
221. See supra notes 17 to 18 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood that some states
might find that the short-term costs of addressing climate change exceed its benefits).
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rider problem, the race to the bottom, and the states' concerns about leak-
age.222
The importance of federal minimums does not, however, erase the
significance of allowing states to set pollution reduction goals above a
federal minimum. That would enable states to meet their citizens' pref-
erences for strong action,223 and provide a structural antidote to potential
political failure at the federal level.224 Since the goals themselves do not
directly implicate national industrial operations, they do not raise the
consistency concerns that might arise in connection with other types of
regulatory measures. Leakage concerns may well deter the states from
enacting more stringent goals, but that does not mean that the law should
deprive them of that opportunity.
2. Efficiency and Emission Standards
(a) Product Standards
In the climate change context, a sampling of the types of product
standards at issue includes appliance efficiency standards, vehicle emis-
sion standards, and, arguably, biofuels standards. 225  Federal legislation
already addresses all of these areas and, in some cases, addresses pre-
emption. Federal legislation in the 1970s gave the federal government
the authority to set appliance efficiency standards, and that federal au-
thority has been amended several times since.226 The states can develop
standards for products not covered by a federal standard.227  Although
federal law presumptively preempts state standards for appliances cov-
ered by federal standards, the states can develop more stringent effi-
ciency standards if they obtain a preemption waiver from the Department
of Energy.228 Somewhat similarly, the Clean Air Act preempts state ve
222. See supra notes 11 to 12 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 45 to 53 and accompanying text.
225. Vehicle emission standards are already addressed under the federal Clean Air Act, which
preempts all states except California from adopting their own state standards, Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 7543(a) (West 2008), although it gives other states the choice of adopting the national or
the California standard. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507 (West 2008). California must, however, obtain a
waiver of preemption from EPA before it can implement its own standards, § 7543(b), a waiver
request that was rejected when California attempted to establish carbon dioxide emissions limits for
mobile sources. See Zachary Coile et al., EPA Blocks California Bid to Limit Greenhouse Gases
from Cars, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2007, at Al.
226. See John C. Dembach, U.S. Policy, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 61, 69-
71 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, APPLIANCE
EFFICIENCY STANDARDS IN THE 2007 ENERGY BILL: KEY FACTS (Dec. 2007),
http://www.standardsasap.org/documents/2007EnergyBill_Standardsfactsheet.pdf.
227. APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, LEADING THE WAY: CONTINUED
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW STATE APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT EFFICIENCY STANDARDS iv (2006)
(observing that states can develop standards for products not governed by federal efficiency stan-
dards), available at http://www.standardsasap.org/documents/a062execsum.pdf.
228. See Dernbach, supra note 226, at 70; David Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 343, 363 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007). The state must demonstrate that
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hile emission standards,2 29 but allows California to adopt divergent
standards if it obtains a preemption waiver from EPA.230 Federal energy
legislation has set biofuels standards for the nation's fuel supply, but
does not preempt the states' ability to set their own biofuels standards.
Since future climate change legislation may revisit these standards and
the preemption question, the discussion remains relevant.
As with federal emission reduction goals, federal minimum stan-
dards are appropriate due to the myriad potential political obstacles to
sufficient state action.231 In addition, the federal government may have
more resources to engage in research,232 and having all 50 states conduct
the same research would be inefficient.233
Moreover, as discussed above, product standards, particularly for
products in national commerce, do raise consistency concerns, since they
could require individual plants to develop separate production lines to
234market their products in different states. In addition, some states
might develop product standards that are intended to protect state indus-
tries rather than the environment.235
Nonetheless, preemption has its costs: If the federal government is
captured by special interests, it could fail to develop standards that some
states believe possible and necessary.236 Federal standards, once devel-
oped, might languish, rather than continually evolve.237 In addition,
companies operating in a global marketplace have survived the inconsis-
tencies presented by differing countries' standards.238 Thus, the best
balance could be some form of limited, rather than complete, preemp-
tion. Federal control, through a waiver requirement, could control the
multiplicity of standards. It could also provide a check against purely
protectionist state standards.
The history of appliance efficiency and motor vehicle standards
suggests that allowing limited state autonomy might be desirable, not-
its more stringent regulation is needed to meet "unusual and compelling State or local energy" needs.
See id. at 363-64.
229. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a).
230. Id. § 7543(b).
231. See supra notes 9 to 19 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
235. See Rabe, Roman & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 32-33 (discussing potential for state fuel
standards to serve protectionist purposes). Mixed motives are, of course, possible. A state that
promotes efficiency is likely to generate industries that achieve it. The issue would be whether the
standard is a pretext that fails to achieve efficiency, not whether the standard would incidentally
favor state industry.
236. See supra notes 47 to 49 and accompanying text.
237. For example, U.S. automakers face a variety of vehicle emissions standards in the global
marketplace.
238. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 90.
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withstanding consistency concerns. 2 9 After appliance efficiency stan-
dards were federalized in the 1970s, the federal government was slow to
adopt standards.2 40  Progress continued, however, because states-like
California-continued to adopt stringent appliance efficiency stan-
dards. 24' Thus, innovation continued notwithstanding the federal paraly-
sis. 142 Over time, increasing state activity created political pressure for
uniform national efficiency standards, prompting federal efficiency stan-
dards for some products.24 3 The cycle of diverse state standards prompt-
ing federal action was repeated recently, as states developed new stan-
dards in the early 2000s, leading Congress to require additional federal
standards in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.244  The states have thus
served as laboratories of invention that have ultimately inspired national
action.
Limited state autonomy has been productive in the automobile
emissions context as well.245  California has frequently taken advantage
of its unique authority to set stricter vehicle emission standards.246 As a
consequence, the state has spurred innovation in the automobile industry
that would not have occurred with a single federal standard.24 7 Although
EPA denied California's recent request for a waiver for its carbon diox-
ide vehicle emissions standards, commentators believe that EPA acted
contrary to statutory provisions requiring that the waiver be granted and
that the courts are likely to reverse the decision (if it is not reversed by
administrative or legislative action before the courts act). 248 These con-
siderations are likely to be relevant to the future preemption fate of state-
set biofuels requirements, like California's low-carbon fuel standard,24 9
239. See Engel, supra note 9, at 170-72.
240. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Energy Efficiency: Long-Standing Problems with
DOE's Program for Setting Efficiency Standards Continue to Result in Forgone Energy Savings,
GAO Rep. No. 07-42, at 9 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0742.pdf; see also
Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 225 (observing that the federal government did not set any effi-
ciency standards because it did not believe they were economically justified); APPLIANCE EFFI-
CIENCY STANDARDS IN THE 2007 ENERGY BILL, supra note 226 (noting that the first federal appli-
ance efficiency standards were not set until 1987).
241. APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, supra note 227, at iii.
242. See Engel, supra note 9, at 170-72.
243. See APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, supra note 227, at iii; Engel & Sale-
ska, supra note 6, at 225-26.
244. APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, supra note 227, at iv.
245. See Carlson, supra note 42, at 311-18 (discussing the value of California's autonomy to
develop its own vehicle emission standards); Engel, supra note 9, at 187.
246. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS: EMISSION REDUCTION STANDARDS FOR VEHICLES, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheetsl
ccfaq.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). California has set more stringent standards many times, and
has almost always received a waiver from EPA to do so. Id.
247. Engel, supra note 9, at 187.
248. See Zachary Coile, Behind EPA's Rejection of State Emission Rules, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24,
2008, at A-1. The recent motor vehicle saga suggests that waiver provisions should clearly set forth
the circumstances in which waivers must be granted, rather than leaving the decision to pure federal
administrative discretion. Otherwise, the states have no recourse against federal capture or inertia.
249. See Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/
print-version/executive-order/5172.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
as the federal government increasingly sets national renewable fuels
standards. °
The appliance efficiency and automobile standards cases indicate
that allowing states to adopt their own standards, subject to federal over-
sight through a waiver provision, could prompt technological innovation
and provide an antidote to the federal government's failure to act. Al-
lowing limited state autonomy would also generate a more dynamic in-
quiry into what is technologically possible, countering potential bureau-
cratic inertia once standards are set.
(b) Pollution Control Standards
In light of the Supreme Court's 2006 ruling, in Massachusetts v.
EPA, that greenhouse gases are "pollutants" under the Clean Air Act,
251
EPA likely already has the authority to control greenhouse gases by set-
ting pollution control standards, like New Source Performance Standards
and the standards associated with New Source Review. 252  As noted
above, the Clean Air Act explicitly allows the states to set more stringent
source controls. 253 Nonetheless, it is possible that a newly-proposed cap-
and-trade program could preempt efforts to establish direct source con-
trols for facilities covered by the cap-and-trade program.254 It is also
possible that the federal government will consider comprehensive cli-
mate change legislation that could explicitly or implicitly preempt state
greenhouse gas controls, notwithstanding the savings clause in the Clean
Air Act. The federalism issues presented by state pollution control stan-
dards therefore require consideration.
Ideally, federal legislation would establish federal minimums for
existing and new facilities to ensure that all facilities adopt available
mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.255 Such federal stan-
250. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492. At
present, the federal renewable fuels requirements and California's low-carbon fuel standard are quite
different, since California's standard is intended to reduce lifecycle carbon emissions and the renew-
able fuels standards do not directly address carbon emissions. In fact, given the carbon intensity
associated with generating corn ethanol, the federal standard might not be a low-carbon standard.
See BRIAN T. TURNER ET AL., CREATING MARKETS FOR BIOFUELS 38 (2007), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/its/tsrcUCB-ITS-TSRC-RR-2007-1/ (concluding that ethanol from coal-
fired facilities generates the same or more greenhouse gases as gasoline).
251. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007).
252. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 101 (regarding new source performance
standards).
253. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416(b) (West 2008).
254. For example, an early version of a bill to create a cap-and-trade program for the electricity
sector would have explicitly exempted state regulation of that industry. DeShazo & Freeman, supra
note 2, at 1536 n. 135. Although deleted, the issue is likely to arise again. Id.
255. Unlike the federal Clean Air Act, federal legislation should direct EPA to set standards for
all existing facilities, avoiding the federal loophole for existing facilities in attainment areas. See
supra note 201 and accompanying text. In that respect, climate legislation could thus be modeled
more on the Clean Water Act, which sets federal minimum standards for all existing sources. Clean
Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 2008).
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dards would help avoid leakage concerns that the states might otherwise
encounter were they to consider state-level regulation.256
Even if the federal government chooses to reduce emissions through
a cap-and-trade program rather than direct regulation, federal legislation
should grant states the power to establish direct greenhouse gas emission
controls on stationary sources. States would thereby retain the ability to
couple the trading system with direct regulations, based on both pruden-
tial257 and equity concerns.258 Allowing divergent state standards would
allow states to meet more stringent goals (if they have them), allow them
to operate as laboratories of invention, avoid bureaucratic inertia on the
issue of what limitations are feasible, and provide an antidote to the risk
of federal capture in setting federal standards.
The case for preempting more stringent production process stan-
dards is less compelling than that for product standards. In the product
context, one industrial plant could face the specter of having to produce
differing products to serve differing state requirements. 259 With produc-
tion process requirements, in contrast, a facility located in one state
would simply have to meet the requirements in that state, not a multiplic-
ity of requirements.260
As with product standards, leakage concerns may make states reluc-
tant to exercise their power to exceed federal pollution control standards.
Nonetheless, I argue that they should retain the option to do so if they
choose.
(c) Building Efficiency Standards
Building efficiency standards present one last example of a standard
that could play a key role in greenhouse gas reductions. While the fed-
eral government would, ideally, set minimum standards, local variations
in weather conditions and materials suggest that state and local entities
should retain their long-standing authority to set more stringent stan-
dards. The building industry has long tolerated divergent local building
standards, and federal consistency is less important for inherently decen-
tralized building activities. Moreover, state and local governments are in
a better position to enforce such broadly-applicable and dispersed stan-
dards.
256. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 101.
257. The primary prudential concern is that the market would be ineffective at prompting
facilities to take already-feasible steps to reduce emissions. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10295-
96.
258. The equity concerns raised by a cap-and-trade program are those discussed supra notes 88
to 114 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
260. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1508.
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B. Delegating Program Implementation
Federalism issues arise not only in connection with goals and stan-
dards, but in connection with program implementation. Many program
parameters are implicated: If federal legislation seeks to meet emission
reduction goals through a cap-and-trade program in addition to or instead
of through direct source regulation, then the legislation must address the
respective federal and state roles in operating the program. Since federal
emission reduction goals are unlikely to be achievable solely through
direct source regulation and/or a cap-and-trade program, and are likely to
require state and local action, then some mechanism, like state imple-
mentation plans, will be necessary to stimulate the necessary state and
local action and to determine how regulatory actions at multiple levels
will ultimately achieve federal goals. In this article, I focus on these two
parameters, but note that federal legislation will have to address other
critical implementation issues as well, including permitting and enforce-
ment systems.
1. Cap-and-Trade Programs
Federal legislation has generally envisioned a nationally-operated
cap-and-trade program.26' While there are undoubtedly benefits to hav-
ing a national-scale trading program, those benefits do not erase the
states' critical interest in the design and operation of cap-and-trade pro-
grams. A national cap-and-trade program could implicate the states'
abilities to achieve state-specific emission reduction goals, their deci-
sions about the most effective way to accomplish emission reductions,
their decisions about how to reconcile environmental justice and eco-
nomic efficiency goals, and their judgment about how to distribute the
economic benefits and costs that could result from a trading program.
First, unlike RGGI or the European Union's initial ETS, I propose a
presumptively national trading program. It is unlikely that all states
would have the resources and will to set up their own programs.262
Nonetheless, I suggest that states be given the option of establishing their
own programs, subject to certain limitations. I propose that the federal
government determine the state's maximum cap, rather than leaving full
discretion to each state. Having a maximum cap set by the federal gov-
ernment rather than allowing states to freely set their caps would help
avoid the inflated state-set caps experienced in the initial phases of the
ETS. 263
261. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 224.
262. Cf Rabe, Roman, & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 11 (discussing some states' unwillingness to
address climate change generally).
263. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing excess allowances issued by Euro-
pean states).
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Certain other features would likely need to be federally-controlled.
Whether administered at the national or state level, a national registry of
emissions, with a standard protocol for registering emissions, is likely to
be necessary. 16 Ideally, monitoring protocols should be standardized,
and the public should have easy access to information about all national
trades.165 With those federal parameters in place, a state could then be
given discretion to decide how many of the allocated allowances it
chooses to distribute and how.
State control over allowance distribution, and the ability to retire
certain allowances, is critical to the state's autonomy to set its own goals
and standards. Without such control, all of the flexibility to set varying
standards discussed in the preceding section could be undermined.
Unless a state can retire unnecessary allowances, a state that set a lower
cap and required its sources to reduce by more than the national goal
2 66
would simply free up allowances that other states' sources could use,
undermining the restrictive state's more demanding goals. In addition, if
a state chose to regulate some sources directly instead of relying solely
on a cap-and-trade program, it would similarly free up allowances that
sources in other states would then use, undermining the reductions the
state hoped to achieve through direct regulation.267 A state could also be
concerned that the national cap would be too high, and allowances too
numerous, to create a strong enough price signal to prompt reductions
and technological innovation. A state could therefore choose to retire
some allowances in order to create higher allowance prices and further
stimulate innovation. 268 Due to monitoring and enforcement concerns, a
state might also choose a narrower sectoral scope for its trading program
than that used in a federal program. If so, the state would want the dis-
264. The states have recognized this reality. More than half the states have agreed to partici-
pate in an emissions registry. Janet Wilson, 31 States to Track Warming: They Form a Climate
Registry that Will Measure and Compile Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Industry, L.A. TIMES, May
9, 2007, at A23.
265. In the event that federal legislation establishes weak monitoring protocols or does not
require transparent information on trading, however, I would argue that states should have the au-
thority to establish more rigorous requirements.
266. States could, alternatively, achieve more stringent state goals by requiring their facilities
to obtain or purchase a higher ratio of allowances for each ton of emissions. That would effectively
"retire" the excess allowances. It is also theoretically possible that reductions to be achieved as a
consequence of more stringent state goals, or reductions achieved through state standards rather than
trading, could be subtracted from the national cap rather than retired by individual states. See
McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 4 (observing that reductions achieved outside of a cap-and-trade
program must be subtracted from the cap). Such an effort would, however, raise a number of com-
plex practical and policy questions that would render it difficult to administer.
267. California, for one, is already engaging in regulatory efforts. See supra notes 93-99
(describing role of regulation in California's implementation of AB 32). While it may ultimately
adopt a cap-and-trade program, the reductions to be achieved through the cap-and-trade program are
likely to be less than would have been necessary had the state not combined the program with a
regulatory effort.
268. Unless a state has a strong technology sector that hopes to benefit from such an approach,
interstate competitiveness concerns are likely to render this approach unlikely. Ideally, the national
cap would be low enough to set an appropriate nationwide price signal.
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cretion to retire the allowances associated with the sectors that were not
included in the state's program. Thus, a state's ability to retire allow-
ances is necessary to give states real authority to adopt more demanding
goals or standards.
State control over allowance distribution would also allow the state
to control key political and economic variables-variables that could
differ by state. States that chose to administer their own programs could
retain some discretion about the degree to which allowances should be
distributed for free or auctioned. Many factors are likely to influence a
state's decision about how much and to whom to auction. The impacts
of auctioning could vary considerably by industry, with differences in
industries' ability to pass costs along to consumers. Different industries
could also face differing competitiveness constraints, and pose varying
risks of "flight" in reaction to auctioning.269 States may also differ in
their commitment to the "polluter pays" principle underlying an auction
approach. Some states may also be concerned that distributing allow-
ances for free could provide undeserved corporate profits.27 °
In order to allow states the freedom to auction, however, the federal
government may need to establish strong minimum auction levels so that
states do not fear that the decision to auction will undermine their com-
petitiveness or generate leakage.271 Under the RGGI program, for exam-
ple, all states are required to auction a minimum of 25 percent of allow-
ances.2 72 Politically, however, the slowly increasing auction levels speci-
fied in proposed federal legislation may be all that can be expected.273
States should thus retain the ability to auction more than the federal mini-
mum.274
Auction revenues could also provide states with a key mechanism
for addressing climate change and its regulatory impacts, including, for
example, energy efficiency assistance to low-income consumers, worker
training and retraining programs, research and development for new
technologies, and adaptation financing.275 Given the critical needs that
could be filled with auction revenues, some federal guidance in the
269. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing risk of leakage).
270. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10295. Complaints about "windfall profits" have tainted
the European Union's trading system. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 14.
271. In the European Union's trading program, for example, few states have auctioned even the
minimum five percent allowable in Phase 1, and few plan to auction up to the minimum ten percent
in Phase 2. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 13-14. One of the innovations in Phase 3's more cen-
tralized program is to establish progressively increasing auction levels for the EU trading program.
See Europa, supra note 188, at 3.
272. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 2(G)(1).
273. See America's Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3201 (2007).
274. Many of the RGGI states are planning to auction well over the required 25 percent. See
Overview ofRGGI C0 2 Budget Program, supra note 161, at 4.
275. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10312 (describing certain environmental justice goals
that could be met with auction revenues).
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state's use of auction revenues would be useful.276 Nonetheless, federal
legislation could provide states that administer their own programs and
choose to auction with some discretionary authority over how to use a
portion of the auction revenues.
State control over a cap-and-trade program would also allow states
to address the environmental justice implications of such programs in the
event that federal legislation does not include sufficient protections. As
discussed above, environmental justice provisions could, potentially,
277have a significant impact on the contours of a trading program. States
should therefore retain the ability to include trading limitations that
achieve environmental co-benefits in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The
limitations could include limits on trading into disadvantaged areas, lim-
its on the use of offsets, and limits on international allowances that do
not achieve domestic reductions.278
Unless federal legislation explicitly allows these types of restric-
tions, the courts could find that they conflict with the terms and goals of
the national trading program and are therefore preempted.2 7 9 For exam-
ple, when New York attempted to regulate trades under the national Acid
Rain Program due to air quality concerns, the Second Circuit held that
the state's efforts were preempted by the national acid rain trading sys-
tem, which did not impose geographic trading limitations.28 °
State implementation of a trading system could also help detect and
prevent violations of traditional air permits. The states have the primary
authority for administering air pollution permits under the Clean Air
Act.281 Separating the management of greenhouse gases from the control
of harmful co-pollutants could increase the likelihood of undetected and
unlawful increases in co-pollutant emissions. If the same agency were
responsible for both greenhouse gases and their co-pollutants, it would
be easier to confirm that changes in greenhouse gas emissions accom-
plished through a trading program did not violate co-pollutant permit
requirements. Given the critical environmental consequences at stake,
states should have the autonomy to control the operation of cap-and-trade
276. See, e.g., America's Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3403.
277. See discussion supra Part lI.B. States might couple trading with direct regulation, limit
trading into heavily-polluted areas, or take other measures to maximize the co-pollutant reduction
benefits of climate change regulation. Id.
278. In order to encourage actual reductions within the regulated sector, the RGGI program
places limits on the use of offsets. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 168.
279. Since the restrictions would likely reduce the cost-savings from trading, they could be
found to conflict with a national goal of facilitating the lowest-cost reductions.
280. Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003). State restrictions on
national trades could also be found invalid under the dormant commerce clause. The district court in
Clean Air Markets addressed this issue. Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160
(N.D.N.Y. 2002). This constitutional question deserves attention but is beyond the scope of this
article.
281. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 2008); 40 C.F.R. § 70.1 (2006).
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programs and to harmonize them with the states' other environmental
objectives.
From a federalism standpoint, a decentralized cap-and-trade pro-
gram is more controversial than decentralized goals, pollution control
standards, or developing state implementation plans for climate action.
An unencumbered national allowance market would likely be easier to
administer than one that is national with respect to trading in some states
and subject to state-based limitations in others. In addition, having dif-
ferent rules in different states would complicate the market's operation
and have some impact on the market's economic efficiency goals. State-
imposed constraints could impede some industries' ability to take advan-
tage of nationally available low-cost emission reduction opportunities.
The difficulties experienced in the European Union's decentralized trad-
ing system suggest the need for caution in allowing state variation within
a national market.282
At the same time, a national cap-and-trade program that precluded
state limitations would sacrifice critical state prerogatives. States would,
in effect, lose control over their individual reduction goals or standards,
which could be thwarted if they simply lead to the increased availability
of allowances elsewhere. They would be unable to control the price sig-
nals that could prompt in-state technological innovation and develop-
ment. And they would not be able to control the co-pollutant conse-
quences of trading and the general distribution of environmental co-
benefits. Not having control over whether to auction or freely distribute
allowances would curtail their ability to address the economic impacts of
trading, and, if they chose, their ability to adopt the "polluter pays" prin-
ciple. Nor could they control the auction revenue stream.
These incursions on state autonomy are a high price to pay for na-
tional efficiency. Moreover, the proposal above would not lead to as
much inefficiency as a purely state-centered approach; it would give
states the option, not require them, to run their cap-and-trade programs.
It is not clear how many states would accept the opportunity.283 If rela-
tively few did, then allowing some state autonomy would not have as
large an impact on efficiency as 50 individual programs.
282. See supra notes 185 to 188 and accompanying text.
283. Of course, if state-centered trading created control over auction revenues, it might provide
states with a strong incentive to adopt their own programs. Those programs could use minimum
federal guidelines, however, so state control over auctioning would not necessarily result in a multi-
plicity of inconsistent state rules. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (describing European
Union's Phase 3 centralized rules coupled with decentralized auctions). This is not to advocate for
centralizing rules to the extent proposed in the EU. But if minimum federal rules are adopted, then
most states are likely to follow the federal rules, reducing the multiplicity of approaches that full
decentralization could engender.
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2. State Implementation Plans
Even a highly centralized federal program is likely to require a role
for the states in achieving federal goals. Once federal legislation estab-
lishes a national emissions reduction goal, a key issue remains: How
will it be achieved? First, many critical sectors are within state, not fed-
eral control, and a state implementation plan could demonstrate how the
states will contribute their part to meeting national goals.284 Second, in
light of the delegation of standard-setting and program operations I pro-
pose, state implementation plans could provide a vehicle for collecting
information on the state programs and providing federal oversight.
Although some policymakers appear to presume that a cap-and-
trade program will provide a sufficient solution, a more multi-faceted
approach is necessary. 285 The federal government cannot simply set the
cap at the targeted reduction level and expect the market's invisible hand
286to efficiently guide the nation toward the required reductions. Not all
sectors are amenable to cap-and-trade: To operate efficiently and effec-
tively, cap-and-trade programs are likely to be limited to major sectors in
which emissions contributions can be effectively monitored. A cap-and-
trade program is therefore unlikely to address small sources or sources
where monitoring is difficult.
A cap-and-trade program is also unlikely to be a tool that could
guide major components of a greenhouse gas reduction policy. To ac-
complish certain goals, like reducing consumer electricity demand, direct
standards like building or appliance efficiency standards are likely to be
more effective than relying on the market to trigger the necessary emis-
sion reduction incentives.28 7 Since buildings consume 70 percent of the
nation's electricity, increasing building standards could be a key mecha-
nism for reducing greenhouse gases, and relying exclusively on the mar-
ket to trigger private incentives for building green would be less predict-
able and effective than developing standards.2 88 Increasing appliance
efficiency is likewise unlikely to emerge effectively through a cap-and-
trade program, except through the clumsy mechanism of increasing en-
ergy costs.
284. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 4-6.
285. See id.; McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 100-0 1.
286. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 6 (describing market imperfections that are likely
to prevent a cap-and-trade program from sending sufficient market signals to induce changes in
consumer demand).
287. See id. (discussing why a cap-and-trade program is unlikely to be sufficient to reduce
consumer demand).
288. Arguably, a cap-and-trade program that drives up energy costs could provide a private
incentive for green buildings, without requiring a regulatory approach. However, operational costs
are often less significant than capital costs in design decisions, dampening the impact of rising
energy prices on building design.
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Other key sources of greenhouse gases, like agriculture, land use
patterns, and landfill practices, may similarly be less amenable to a cap-
and-trade program, in part due to monitoring and verification difficul-
ties.289 Land use is the key driver of the nation's transportation-related
emissions. 290 Transportation constitutes almost 28 percent of the nation's
greenhouse gas emissions. 291 Even as cars have grown more efficient,
the number of vehicle miles traveled has continued to increase, largely as
a consequence of continued sprawl.292 Reducing vehicle miles traveled
through smart growth requirements and improved public transit is likely
to be an essential component of an effective climate change policy,
2 93
and one that cannot be accomplished through a cap-and-trade program.
If setting a cap in a cap-and-trade program will not assure achieve-
ment of a national net reduction goal, then additional mechanisms will be
necessary. However, many of the sectors that are not amenable to cap-
and-trade are sectors that have historically been within state and local
control, such as building standards, land use, and agricultural policy.
294
While minimum federal standards are appropriate where possible, the
states should arguably be given a significant role in implementing poli-
cies over which they have had traditional control. For example, on both
a political and a practical front, it is difficult to imagine how the federal
government could establish and administer land use policy.
The federal government thus needs state planning to achieve federal
goals.29' The Clean Air Act's State Implementation Plans could provide
289. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 7. The agriculture and landfill sectors could
conceivably be addressed by allowing facilities in a cap-and-trade program to purchase offsets from
these sectors to meet their emission reduction targets. However, such programs are likely to be beset
by significant permanence and verification issues that could preclude the use of offsets from the
agricultural sector.
290. See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get
Therefrom Here? 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1529, 1531-32 (2002) (observing the role of post-World-
War-II suburban sprawl in increasing motor vehicle use).
291. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVTL. FORECASTING,
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMiSSIONS, 2005, http://www.climate.dot.gov.
292. See ROBERT PATERSON ET AL., TECHNIQUES FOR MITIGATING URBAN SPRAWL 10 (2003)
http://www.utexas.edu/research/ctr/pdf reports/0 4420 2.pdf (stating that VMT increased by almost
100 percent between 1969-1989, while population increased by only 22.5 percent); U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF TRANSP.
STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/DLSelectFields.asp?TablelD=507&DBShortName=
VMT (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (observing that national VMT increased almost 30 percent from
1990 to 2001).
293. Cf Pollard, supra note 290, at 1549-50 (proposing denser development to reduce driving
and its associated environmental impact).
294. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1217 (observing the need for a state role in areas like
land use and natural resources law that have long been under state and local controls).
295. A federal law imposing a state planning requirement would have to avoid the constitu-
tional limits on the federal government's ability to require the states to act. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (invalidating a state law that "commandeers" states to carry out
federal statutes). The legislation could condition state funding on the completion of state plans, or as
in the Clean Air Act, it could provide the states with the alternative of having the federal government
prepare their plans for them. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198-99 (observing that a state that failed
to follow state requirements retains the "exit option" of having EPA assume responsibility).
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a model.29 6  Instead of focusing on achieving local air quality standards,
the federal government could determine how much each state must re-
duce its emissions for the nation as a whole to meet its goals. 297  The
process would presumably begin with a flat percentage reduction from a
baseline. The states will undoubtedly expect other relevant factors to be
taken into consideration, including some sort of credit for states that have
already taken emission reduction steps, 298 as well as some recognition of
the extent to which emissions are generated for the use of other states (a
likely concern for power-generating states). The process is likely to be
contested, but this article is not the place to resolve how each state's al-
location should be set. It is also possible that setting state-specific allo-
cations would be so contested that it would not be politically feasible.
Whether state-specific reduction targets are established or not, state
planning to meet federal goals would nonetheless serve many useful
functions, and would build upon the climate change planning efforts
many states have already undertaken.29 9 In a state implementation plan,
the states could indicate how they have adopted any minimum federal
standards or programs that have been established. Since federal mini-
mum standards and programs are unlikely to be sufficient to reach fed-
eral emission reduction goals,30 0 the states would have to indicate how
they plan to address sectors within their control. Given that the sources
of each state's greenhouse gas emissions differ markedly, states are
likely to develop very different programs and to respond to state-specific
conditions and priorities.3°' States that generate electricity are likely to
296. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 2008). Kenneth A. Manaster & Daniel P. Selmi, Federal
Standards and State Implementation-State Implementation Plans, 1 STATE ENVTL. L. § 6.5 (2007)
(providing a basic description of state implementation plans).
297. McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 7-8 (describing numerous potential variables for
determining state reduction obligations). The process could be similar to the development of the
"burden-sharing agreement" developed within the European Union, in which the European nations
determined emissions goals for each state in light of the collective European goal established under
the Kyoto Protocol. See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (EU-ETS): INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-5 (describing burden-
sharing agreement) (2005), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
EU%2DETS%2OWhite%20Paper%2Epdf.
298. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 7 (suggesting that, in allocating emission reduc-
tion responsibilities to the states, states should receive early action credit); ef Nicholas DiMascio,
Credit Where Credit Is Due: The Legal Treatment of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions,
56 DuKE L.J. 1587, 1593-98 (2007) (in the context of industry early action, discussing the general
benefits and attributes of credit for early action of emissions reductions).
299. Many states are already creating climate action plans. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, STATES WITH CLIMATE ACTION PLANS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what s_
beingdone/in the states/action_plan map.cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (map indicating states
with climate action plans).
300. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 6 (emphasizing the importance of state implemen-
tation plans because "as is often the case, uniform national standards are not sufficient to achieve the
needed reductions and additional reduction measures need to be undertaken.").
301. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198 (stating that decisions about how to reduce air
pollutants implicate significant political and economic issues); Brent Yarnal & Rob Neff, Primary
Sources of Greenhouse Gases: A Cross-Scale Comparison, 12 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 173, 178
(2004) (using the state of Pennsylvania as an example of how states can vary in their sources of
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focus on that sector, and will have to determine whether a national cap-
and-trade program will achieve sufficient reductions. States for which
transportation is a significant component are more likely to focus on land
use changes and public transportation, and to be more likely to adopt
measures like California's vehicle emission standards if possible. °2
Cold states are more likely to focus on weatherization and energy effi-
cient building codes than warm states. States could address the sectors
uniquely within their control, and could play a key role in developing
strategies to meet national goals.
In order to address the risk that states will fail to take the planning
process seriously and fail to adequately generate reductions from the
sectors under their control, the federal government will need to establish
minimum SIP expectations. The states should be required to demon-
strate regulatory actions in the sectors where change is inevitably neces-
sary, like land use and transportation, notwithstanding the political con-
troversy such controls are likely to generate.30 3 Ultimately, the federal
government should review and approve the states' implementation plans
to ensure that they will lead to promised reductions. Since states may
differ in their commitment to real and difficult climate change measures,
federal oversight and enforcement is necessary to ensure that the states'
plans are sufficient.
A state planning process accords with federalism principles.30 5
Minimum federal requirements and oversight could help overcome state
inertia or internal political obstacles to state action. But providing the
states with a role in determining how to implement reductions would
allow those with the relevant information and expertise to devise strate-
gies.30 6 It would also give states leeway to broker the thorny political
emissions and concluding that a national "mitigation strategy must take into account regional and
local differences in emissions.").
302. In California, for example, transportation accounts for 39 percent of emissions and in-state
electricity-generation for only 14 percent. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S GROSS GHG
EMISSIONS IN 2004, http://www.energy.ca.gov/global climate change/inventory/
index.htmi (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). In contrast, the national averages are 27.7 percent for trans-
portation and 33.5 percent for electricity-generation. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE AND ENVTL. FORECASTING, PERCENTAGE OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, 2005,
http://climate.dot.gov/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). Also, the future of California's greenhouse gas
emissions standards for vehicles is in limbo, since California did not receive the necessary waiver of
preemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See Coile, supra note 240. However,
the state has challenged EPA's waiver denial. See Bob Egelko, State Sues EPA to Force Waiver
over Greenhouse Gas Emissions, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2008, at A-I.
303. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1206-08 (describing state resistance to including land use
and transportation in their SIPs).
304. Ideally, federal legislation would create a less cumbersome bureaucratic process than the
Clean Air Act's SIP review process. See Manaster & Selmi, supra note 296, § 6.5 (describing SIP
process).
305. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 1, at 79-85 (discussing the merits of a cooperative federalist
approach).
306. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 87-88.
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and economic challenges that addressing climate change involves.
30 7
Allowing state autonomy could also foster laboratories of invention as
states struggle to change long-established patterns, such as unsustainable
land use.
CONCLUSION
Federal legislation is clearly necessary to address climate change.
The global nature of climate change presents too many obstacles to state
action to expect the current momentum driving state programs to con-
tinue or to be sufficient.
Federal policymakers may be tempted to design a purely national
program by its relative simplicity and in light of strong political pres-
sures for federal consistency.30 8 But the federal government cannot meet
emission reduction goals by itself. The states are better able to address
many of the relevant sources and sectors. Moreover, giving the federal
government a monopoly over climate change policy would deprive the
states of control over key political, economic, and environmental vari-
ables, deprive the nation of the technological and regulatory innovation
benefits of multiple actors, and fail to provide a check on potential politi-
cal capture.
A cooperative federalist system, despite its inherent complexity,
provides a sounder model for federal climate change legislation. Almost
all the nation's environmental laws recognize the importance of distribut-
ing power to both the federal government and the states. The fact that
climate change is a more global environmental problem does not give the
states any less interest in having at least some control over implementa-
tion decisions that will inevitably have far-reaching societal impacts.
307. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198 (indicating the political significance of air pollution
control implementation decisions and their impact on land use and economic development); id. at
1218 (stating that local political support and involvement is essential to the success of national
environmental goals).
308. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.

